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Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular 
Representation in Agency Rulemaking 
Evan J. Criddle* 
Do administrative agencies undermine popular sovereignty when they make 
federal law? Over the last several decades, some scholars have argued that 
rulemaking by unelected agency officials imperils popular sovereignty and that 
federal law shouid resolve the apparent tension between regulatory practice and 
democratic principle by allowing the President to serve as a proxy for the "will 
of the people" in the administrative state. According to this view, placing 
federal rulemaking power firmly within the President's managerial control 
would advance popular preferences throughout the federal system. 
This conventional wisdom is misguided. As political scientists have long 
recognized, the electorate's relative disengagement from the federal regulatory 
process prevents voters from developing coherent preferences about most 
questions of regulatory policy. Moreover, even if discrete preferences could be 
attributed to the people as a whole, the American presidency does not in practice 
serve as a reliable proxy for majoritarian preferences in the administrative state. 
As an alternative to presidential "proxy representation, " this Article 
argues that federal administrative law should seek to promote popular 
representation in agency rulemaking through "fiduciary representation. " Like 
fiduciaries in private law, all federal officers exercise discretionary 
administrative authority for the benefit of those subject to their power, and all 
are bound by duties of purposefulness, fairness, integrity, solicitude, 
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reasonableness, and transparency. Rather than focus on a representative's 
obedience to the ephemeral public will, fiduciary representation emphasizes 
agencies ' responsibilities to act deliberatively and reasonably in promoting the 
public welfare. On this account, presidential administration is one plausible 
strategy for reconciling administrative lawmaking with popular sovereignty, but 
it is not necessarily the most promising strategy. Congress may 
counterintuitively promote popular representation in the administrative state by 
vesting final rulemaking authority in unelected agency administrators rather 
than the popularly elected President. 
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I. Introduction 
Ever since Alexander Bickel published The Least Dangerous Branch in 
1962, American constitutional theorists have agonized over the supposedly 
"countermajoritarian" character of judicial review.' Bickel's quandary can 
be summarized succinctly: judicial review empowers federal judges to strike 
down legislation in defiance of congressional majorities and the popularly 
elected President; yet unlike Congress and the President, federal judges are 
arguably poor proxies for the popular will because they are appointed for life, 
do not derive their authority directly from any particular constituency, and 
are not called to account for their decisions outside the four comers of their 
published decisions? Explaining why judicial interpretations of the 
Constitution should trump executive and legislative interpretations, and 
under what circumstances, has occupied legal theorists for a generation.3 At 
the heart of these debates lies Bickel's faith in popular representation as the 
keystone of American constitutional democracy.4 
Curiously, while Bickel singled out judicial review for censure as "a 
deviant institution in the American democracy," he casually dismissed the 
notion that administrative lawmaking might also undermine popular 
I. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962). 
2. !d. at 16-19; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 41 ( 1980) (suggesting that unless courts could develop "a principled approach" to 
judicial review "that is not hopelessly inconsistent with our nation's commitment to representative 
democracy, responsible commentators must consider seriously the possibility that courts simply 
should stay away"). 
3. See, e.g. , ELY, supra note 2, at 87 (seeking to resolve Bickel's countermajoritarian difficulty 
through a "participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review"); Rebecca 
Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1998) (arguing 
that the Constitution does not seek to promote majoritarian preferences but rather individual 
liberty); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to 
Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333, 335-36 (1998) ("[T]he countermajoritarian difficulty 
describes ' the dominant paradigm of constitutional law and scholarship, a paradigm that emphasizes 
the democratic roots of the American polity and that characterizes judicial review as at odds with 
American democracy."' (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: 
The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 61 ( 1989))); Barry Friedman, The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Two: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. I, 48-53 
(2002) (discussing generally the evolution of judicial supremacy); Barry Friedman, The History of 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson ofLochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1383, 
1387 (2001) (arguing that if those familiar with judicial decisions do not believe those decisions are 
socially correct, they will be seen as illegitimate); Barry Friedman, The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 984-88 (2000) 
("Modem constitutional theorists have struggled to reconcile the practice of judicial review with 
democratic governance."); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 162-71 (2002) ("Constitutional 
scholars are fixated on the legitimacy of constitutional courts. They cannot stop talking about the 
countermajoritarian difficulty . ... "); Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE 
L.J. 486,488-92,498 (1982) (observing that countermajoritarianism is not unique to judicial review 
but is part and parcel of representative government). 
4. BICKEL, supra note I, at 17. 
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representation.5 Bickel believed that federal agencies posed little danger to 
the popular will because their lawmaking authority was merely "interstitial or 
technical" and could be exercised only pursuant to congressional 
authorization.6 Such sentiments reflected the conventional wisdom of the 
early 1960s, a time when agency rulemaking had yet to emerge as the dy-
namic and pervasive force it is today.7 When Bickel composed The Least 
Dangerous Branch, federal agencies still operated primarily through adjudi-
catory proceedings, devoting scant attention and few resources to rulemaking 
initiatives. 8 Over the next several years, however, a chorus of criticism over 
perceived regulatory torpor prompted the Kennedy and Johnson 
Administrations to emphasize agency rulemaking as a device for 
reinvigorating administrative govemance.9 Congress followed suit, creating 
new agencies with rulemaking authority and expanding existing agencies' 
rulemaking jurisdiction. 10 As a result of these developments, federal 
rulemaking experienced explosive growth during the 1960s and 1970s, with 
the annual number of federal rulemaking initiatives increasing almost 500% 
between 1960 and 1974. 11 By the 1970s, the dawning "age ofrulemaking"12 
posed an existential challenge to Bickel's democratic faith, which Bickel 
failed to anticipate-namely, how to reconcile agency lawmaking with the 
republic's constitutional commitments to popular sovereignty and represen-
tative democracy. 
If anything, subsequent developments have only enhanced this 
question's salience. 13 Federal agencies today generate roughly 4,000 
regulations per year, far outpacing Congress's annual output of fewer than 
5. !d. at 16-18. 
6. /d. at 19. 
7. Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 
1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1139, 1145-46 (2001). 
8. Jd. 
9. See id. (discussing the expansion of agency rulemaking throughout the 1960s and 1970s). 
10. Jd. at 1148-49. 
II. ld. at 1147; see also THEODORE J. LOW!, THE END OF LiBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC 
OF THE UNITED STATES 113 (2d ed. 1979) ("During [the] six-year period [between 1970 and 
1976] ... the number of pages published annually in the Federal Register more than tripled and the 
number of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations grew by 33 percent . .. . [I]n 1936 the Federal 
Register had a total of 2,400 pages. By 1970 it contained 20,000 pages. By 1976 it contained 
60,000 pages."); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 33-34 (3d 
ed. 1999) (recounting the creation and expansion of federal administrative agencies between 1960 
and 1980). 
12. J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 
59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375 (1974). 
13. See I RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATfVE LAW TREATISE§ 1.7, at 16-19 (4th ed. 
2002) (chronicling the courts' struggle to situate agencies in our governmental system as well as to 
determine the proper role for each of our three branches of government with regard to agency policy 
making). 
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400 bills. 14 The rising tide of federal regulation over the last four decades 
cannot easily be dismissed as merely "interstitial and technical"15 because 
federal regulators increasingly claim primary responsibility for resolving 
portentous policy questions in fields such as the environment, energy, and 
occupational health and safety. 16 Agency regulations commonly have the 
force of law, subject to the same sanctions as federallegislation. 17 Although 
most agency rulemaking initiatives are subject to judicial review for compli-
ance with congressional standards, federal statutes often provide vague or 
ambiguous instructions, and federal courts routinely defer to agencies' 
statutory interpretations under the Chevron and Mead/Skidmore doctrines. 18 
As a result of these and other developments, the scope of agency rulemaking 
powers has expanded dramatically since Bickel's era. 19 
Concerns about the perceived countermajoritarian character of 
administrative rulemaking have prompted some legal scholars and Executive 
Branch officials to suggest that federal administrative law should enhance 
popular representation through "presidential administration. "20 They argue 
that agencies should recognize the President's legal authority to direct 
agency rulemaking initiatives toward policies that best reflect the "will of the 
14. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., TEN THOUSAND 
COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 2 (2007), http:// 
www.cei.org/pdf/6018.pdf. 
15. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't ofEduc., 550 U.S. 81, 90 (2007) (characterizing 
rulemaking as "the kind of highly technical, specialized interstitial matter that Congress often does 
not decide itself, but delegates to specialized agencies to decide"). 
16. See PIERCE, supra note 11, at 34 (listing the agencies formed to address these policy 
questions). 
17. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW§§ 2.25, 4.3, at 90-91, 169 (3d ed. 1991). 
18. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (applying the Skidmore 
standard to a customs-ruling letter and giving the letter a level of respect proportionate to its power 
to persuade); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) 
(holding that federal courts must defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes). 
19. See PIERCE, supra note 13, § 1.5, at 10-14 (tracing the historical expansion of the 
regulatory state especially in the 1960s-1990s after Bickel's original publishing date). 
20. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2335 (2001) 
(arguing that the President's national constituency, desire for reelection, and desire for a strong and 
favorable legacy create incentives that make administrative rulemaking through presidential 
administration more majoritarian); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 105--06 (1994) ("But because the President has a national 
constituency-unlike relevant members of Congress, who oversee independent agencies with often 
parochial agendas-it appears to operate as an important counterweight to factional influence over 
administration."); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential 
Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1193-95 ( 1994) ("[T]he 
President ... is less vulnerable [than Congress] to targeted appeals by interest 
groups .... Significantly, the President sits atop the regulatory system as the leader of the federal 
bureaucracy. If anyone is positioned to coordinate diffuse regulatory policy, it is the President, as 
leader of the executive branch."). 
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people."21 As the only federal official elected by and accountable to a 
national constituency, the President (with the Vice President) arguably 
receives a unique popular mandate in matters of national policy?2 This 
mandate, combined with continuing political pressures to honor public 
opinion, supposedly ensures that the President will ordinarily resolve regu-
latory disputes in conformity with majoritarian preferences.23 Supporters of 
presidential administration argue further that enhanced presidential control 
over agency regulation would improve the transparency of agency 
rulemaking, facilitate interagency cooperation, and ultimately make agencies 
more effective and accountable instruments for advancing the public 
interest.24 Acting through the President, the American people would be 
better able to craft regulations responsive to their own collective perception 
of the common good. 
This vision of the President as a proxy for majoritarian preferences has 
profoundly influenced public discourse about the administrative state for the 
past quarter century. As I will explain more fully in Part II, every president 
since Richard Nixon has taken steps to strengthen and formalize White 
House influence over agency rulemaking proceedings, from Ronald Reagan's 
introduction of rigorous regulatory review by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMBi5 to Bill Clinton's issuance of formal presidential directives 
to spur agency rulemaking.26 In INS v. Chadha,27 the Supreme Court fa-
mously invoked the rhetoric of presidential popular representation, 
emphasizing the President's unique electoral mandate as a prophylaxis 
against regional factionalism and special-interest capture.28 Although the 
21. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. 
L. REV. 23, 35 (1995); Kagan, supra note 20, at 2335; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 105-06; 
Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 1193-95. 
22. See Calabresi, supra note 21, at 35 (arguing that, as the only nationally elected official, the 
President (along with the Vice President) has a unique popular mandate in national policy matters). 
23. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 875-76 (1997) (describing the argument 
that the President's responsiveness to the popular will supports augmenting his control over 
administrative agencies). But see Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the 
Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1217, 1227-46 (2006) (criticizing the "Plebiscitary 
President" theory and presenting extensive argument and empirical evidence against the President 
as a nonparochial, majoritarian actor). 
24. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 20, at 2331-46 (making an extended case for presidential 
administration); Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 1193-95 (exploring the comparative advantage of the 
President over other government actors in tending the administrative state). 
25. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 127 (1982) (stating that the purpose of the 
Office of Management and Budget is to "provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory 
process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations, and insure well-reasoned regulations 
[through OMB review]"). 
26. See Kagan, supra note 20, at 2290-2303 (tracing the history of the Clinton Administration's 
use of presidential directives to steer policy). 
27. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
28. See id. at 948 ("[T]he Presentment Clauses serve the important purpose of assuring that a 
'national perspective' is grafted on the legislative process."); id. ("'The President is a representative 
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case for presidential administration has been challenged on constitutionae9 
and statutory grounds,30 the underlying normative vision of presidential 
administration as a formula for strengthening popular representation in 
agency rulemaking has gained widespread acceptance and continues to at-
tract adherents today. 31 
This Article accepts Bickel's assertion that popular representation is 
foundational to political legitimacy in a democratic republic, but it challenges 
the thesis that presidential administration is an effective strategy for advanc-
ing majoritarian preferences in agency rulemaking. Part III demonstrates that 
none of the leading arguments for equating the President's preferences on 
questions of regulatory policy with the will of the people can withstand close 
scrutiny. Over the years, political scientists have assembled a wealth of em-
pirical evidence that national elections do not confer mandates upon 
presidents to pursue specific regulatory policies.32 Nor does the postelection 
threat of a future electoral defeat or the disapproving judgment of future his-
torians ensure that presidents will adopt policies consistent with majority 
opm10n. In practice, there are simply no guarantees that particular presi-
dential regulatory policies will be more closely correlated with public 
of the people just as the members of the Senate and of the House are, and it may be, at some times , 
on some subjects, that the President elected by all the people is rather more representative of them 
all . . .. "' (quoting Myers v . United States, 272 U .S. 52, 123 (1926))). 
29. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency 's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 1346, 1346 (1994) ("[A] proper structural analysis of the Constitution undermines the 
constitutional case for an executive branch with a chain of command organized along military lines 
and instead emphasizes the existence of a discernible balance between Congress ' s role in 
structuring the executive and the President's inherent and default powers."); Robert V . Percival, 
Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 
963, 966 (2001) (" [A]lthough the president's ability to remove agency heads gives him enormous 
power to influence their decisions, it does not give him the authority to dictate substantive decisions 
entrusted to them by law."). 
30. See Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, I 06 
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 263 (2006) (asserting that "the President has statutory authority to direct the 
administration of the laws only under statutes that grant to the President in name," contrary to other 
prevalent theories of presidential power, which suggest that a statutory grant of power to an 
executive officer "implicitly confers that authority upon the President," as well). 
31. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 21, at 35 ("Representing as he does a national electoral 
college majority, the President at least has an incentive to steer national resources towards the 51% 
of the nation that last supported him (and that might support him again) .... "). 
32. See generally MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPfNI & SCOIT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW 
ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MAITERS 2-4 (1996) (arguing that varying levels of political 
knowledge within a democratic electorate make it difficult to discern specific policy positions held 
by the public); STANLEY KELLEY, JR., INTERPRETING ELECTIONS 135-37 (1983) (presenting 
different critics' skepticism of claims of mandate due to the difficulty of isolating voters' intentions 
regarding a single issue); Robert A. Dahl, Myth of the Presidential Mandate, !05 POL. SCI. Q. 355, 
355-72 (1990) (characterizing the theory of mandates as a myth that has contributed to a pseudo-
democratization of the presidency); John A. Ferejohn, Information and the Electoral Process, in 
INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 3, 6-19 (John A. Ferejohn & James H. Kuklinski 
eds., 1990) (indicating that voters' lack of information and lack of sufficient tools to communicate 
their will to officeholders leaves those officeholders with no clear way to decipher the public's 
will). 
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opm10n than policies developed through ordinary agency rulemaking 
proceedings. Moreover, the argument for presidential administration 
founders on a more basic problem: the public's pervasive ignorance about 
regulatory governance. The notion that presidents (or any other public 
officials) might serve as reliable proxies for majoritarian preferences in 
agency rulemaking becomes indefensible once one acknowledges that the 
American public generally knows little about even those regulatory initia-
tives that most directly affect their interests. For the vast preponderance of 
agency rulemaking proposals, the public simply does not have any coherent 
opinion.33 As such, the notion that presidents act as proxies for majoritarian 
preferences does not furnish a credible account of popular representation in 
agency rulemaking. 
In Part IV, I argue that American administrative law should abandon the 
misguided search for a unitary oracle of the public will and instead safeguard 
popular sovereignty34 in agency rulemaking by adopting a fiduciary model of 
popular representation.35 Administrative agencies, like private-law 
fiduciaries, exercise discretionary power of an administrative nature over the 
legal or practical interests of their beneficiaries, the people subject to state 
power. To promote popular representation under the fiduciary model of the 
state, administrative agencies must exercise their rulemaking powers in a 
manner that satisfies six core principles: purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, 
fairness, reasonableness, and transparency.36 At a minimum, these principles 
obligate federal agencies to act deliberately (not reflexively) and 
deliberatively (not arbitrarily or unilaterally) when considering potential 
rulemaking actions, taking appropriate care to investigate reasonable alterna-
tives and to provide rational explanations for their decisions on the public 
record. I argue that Congress should operationalize the fiduciary model in 
federal rulemaking by amending the federal Administrative Procedure Act 
33. See, e.g., DELLI CARP!Nl & KEETER, supra note 32, at 79-82 (demonstrating through poll-
response results the general public's lack of knowledge regarding current events and politics). 
34. I recognize, of course, that "popular sovereignty" is itself a contested concept, and this is 
not the place for a detailed explication or defense of the idea. For purposes of this Article, I use the 
term "sovereignty" not in the classical Blackstonian sense of"absolute despotic power" but rather to 
capture the general idea that the state must respond to the legitimate interests of its subjects, 
however defined. See Christopher Morris, The Very Idea of Popular Sovereignty, in DEMOCRACY 
I, 5, 12 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2000) ("Goverrunent has authority (i.e., is permitted or has 
the right) to act only insofar as it is so authorized, and this authorization must come from the People 
governed."). 
35. For an argument that U.S. administrative law as a whole rests upon a fiduciary model of 
state authority, see Evan 1. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 117, 120 (2006). 
36. See Evan 1. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE 1. 
INT'L L. 330, 331 (2009); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 
QUEENS L.1. 259, 301-10 (2005) (both discussing these requirements in greater detail); see also 1.1. 
Spigelman, Foundations of Administrative Law: Toward General Principles of Institutional Law, 58 
AUSTL. 1. OF PUB. ADMIN. 3, 9 (1999) (noting "similarities between the regulation of the exercise of 
public power and the traditional control by courts of equity of the exercise of fiduciary powers," 
including the overarching requirements of purposefulness, rationality, and solicitude). 
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(APA) to eliminate the categorical exceptions to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, expand judicial review of agency inaction, and include White 
House communications concerning pending agency rulemaking actions on 
the public record. The common thread that connects these three proposals is 
a vision of agency rulemaking as a locus of other-regarding, purposive, and 
deliberative administration. 
I conclude in Part V with an exploration of the fiduciary model's 
implications for presidential administration. Although presidential 
administration is not inconsistent with the fiduciary model on its face, I argue 
that a comparison of presidents and agency heads under the six principles of 
fiduciary administration supports the view that agency heads are, by and 
large, better positioned to serve as fiduciary representatives in administrative 
lawmaking. For example, agency administrators tend to possess greater ex-
pertise in their fields of labor and are better positioned than the President to 
engage in detailed, deliberative consideration of particular regulatory 
proposals. Agency administrators are also more likely to engage diverse 
perspectives and provide reasoned justifications for their decisions. As a 
result, Congress may promote popular representation by entrusting final 
rulemaking authority to unelected agency administrators rather than the 
popularly elected President, provided it does so in the right way. 
The fiduciary model of popular representation does not ensure that 
federal regulations will always embody the will of the people, but neither 
does presidential administration in a pluralistic society plagued by pervasive 
knowledge gaps about federal regulation. What the fiduciary model does 
offer is a vision of administrative lawmaking that promotes the public wel-
fare by honoring congressional delegations of authority to agency heads, 
facilitating reasoned justification and deliberative accountability, utilizing 
agency experience and expertise, promoting transparency, and minimizing 
the dangers of clandestine interest-group influence. By refrarning the con-
cept of popular representation as emanating from reasoned deliberation 
among government institutions and between administrative agencies and the 
body politic, the fiduciary model furnishes a promising new framework for 
rethinking popular representation in agency rulemaking. 
II. Presidential Administration 
This Part offers a brief introduction to presidential administration in 
federal administrative law. I begin by explaining how the movement to cen-
tralize agency rulemaking under the President's managerial control reflects a 
pro-majoritarian vision of popular representation in the administrative state. 
I then review the last four decades of presidential administration, from 
Richard Nixon to Barack Obama, summarizing each president's efforts to 
enhance the White House's managerial control over agency rulemaking 
through ever-intensifying levels of regulatory oversight. 
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A. Three Models of Popular Representation 
For generations, American legal scholars have tended to take for 
granted that the administrative state's political legitimacy depends, at least in 
part, upon its congeniality to popular representation. 37 If popular sovereignty 
expresses itself through popular representation, and if administrative 
lawmaking frustrates popular representation, then the entire enterprise of 
administrative lawmaking could be called into question as a violation of 
popular sovereignty. Thus, an enduring challenge for defenders of the ad-
ministrative state has been to construct a model of agency rulemaking that 
would reconcile discretionary agency lawmaking with mainstream dem-
ocratic theory. 
Several models of popular representation have emerged over the years 
to fill this gap in administrative law's theoretical foundations. 38 Each of 
these models frames the concept of representation in a different way.39 
However, none furnishes a satisfying account of the relationship between 
popular sovereignty and administrative lawmaking. 
Prior to World War II, the conventional view among judges and legal 
academics was that the legislative process satisfied the demand for popular 
representation in the administrative state.4° Congress, acting as popular 
representative, would resolve any disputed policy matters in statutory 
directives to federal agencies, and agencies, in tum, would translate and im-
plement those generalist directives in specific contexts.41 This vision of 
agencies as dispassionate transmission belts for congressional policy deci-
sions became untenable, however, once Legal Realists turned their sights to 
the ubiquity of agency policy-making discretion.42 In practice, vague legisla-
tive directives left too many critical policy questions to be resolved at the 
level of agency implementation.43 Far from acting as mere technocratic 
37. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1673-75 (1975). 
38. See Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 
94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1618-23 (1985) (illustrating the historical development of the models for 
administrative decision making); see also Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 
98 HARV. L. REv. 505, 577-78 (1985) (describing these models). 
39. See Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 
567, 569-90 (1992) (discussing the models of administrative law and their theoretical 
underpinnings). 
40. See Stewart, supra note 37, at 1671-76 (describing the traditional model of American 
administrative law). 
41. Id. at 1673-75; see also Garland, supra note 38, at 577-78 (describing the primary 
theoretical models used by scholars to describe administrative agency decision making); Reich, 
supra note 38, at 1618 (discussing the history of models of administrative decision making). 
42. See Werhan, supra note 39, at 574-76 (discussing the influence of legal realism on the 
theory of administrative law). 
43. Stewart, supra note 37, at 1677; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: 
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 471 (2003) 
(suggesting that the transmission-belt theory proved inadequate in practice due to the vagueness of 
legislative directives). 
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servants of congressional directives, federal agencies frequently had to 
resolve fundamental policy questions with little direction from Congress.44 
One response to the transmission-belt model's collapse was the 
emergence of an "interest-group representation" model rooted in public-
choice theory.45 Rather than focus on Congress's statutory instructions as a 
source of democratic legitimacy, the interest-group representation model 
characterized the public's direct participation in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking proceedings under the APA as a form of popular representation.46 
"The job of the public administrator, according to this vision, was to 
accommodate-to the extent possible-the varying demands placed upon 
government by competing groups," explained Robert Reich.47 "The public 
administrator was a referee, a skillful practitioner of negotiation and 
compromise."48 Agency administrators, like legislators, would seek to 
maximize popular preferences as revealed during the public comment phase 
of informal notice-and-comment rulemaking.49 In contrast, judicial review 
was viewed with suspicion as a potentially deviant intrusion into majoritarian 
rulemaking processes. 50 
As Richard Stewart and others have observed, the interest-group 
representation model could not withstand scrutiny as a theory of popular 
representation. 51 In practice, agencies did not always seek to maximize 
popular preferences when selecting between policy alternatives. 52 All too 
often, agencies were perceived as catering to narrow interest-group prefer-
ences to the neglect of broader public interests. 53 More troubling still, federal 
courts rendered only limited assistance as agents of interest-group 
"representation reinforcement." Even under so-called "hard look" review of 
agency regulations, federal courts did not compel agencies to accept interest-
group comments as binding referenda on regulatory policy; rather, proposed 
44. See James 0. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 
372 (1976) (indicating that Congress regularly delegates questions to agencies yet gives the agency 
"no more guidance than a statutory standard of vaguely-defined breadth"). 
45. Stewart, supra note 37, at 1760; see also Garland, supra note 38, at 579 ("The interest 
representation model evolved in response to widespread disillusionment with both the 'transmission 
belt' and 'expertise' models of administrative action."). 
46. See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA. the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 
1978 SUP. CT. REv. 345, 346--48 (revealing that it is common for agencies to allow interested 
persons to present oral comments to the agency itself or for agencies to employ public panel 
discussions to explore issues). 
47. Reich, supra note 38, at 1620. 
48. /d. at 1619-20. 
49. Garland, supra note 38, at 580-81. 
50. Bressman, supra note 43, at 484. 
51. Stewart, supra note 37, at 1775-81. 
52. See Garland, supra note 38, at 583 (remarking that procedural requirements appeared to 
offer little protection when an agency had already determined what course to undertake before the 
period of public participation began). 
53. MATTHEW A . CRENSON, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: HOW AMERICA SIDELINED ITS 
CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC 118-21 (2004). 
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rules could satisfy judicial review as long as agencies provided a rational 
explanation for rejecting interest-group preferences.54 Viewed in this light, 
the interest-group representation model was far less persuasive. Critics be-
gan calling into question the value of notice-and-comment procedures, 
contending that public participation dramatically increased the administrative 
costs of regulation without yielding the desired benefit: popular control over 
regulatory policy. 55 
As the interest-group representation model fell into disfavor, the late 
1970s and 1980s witnessed a return to Bickel's majoritarian paradigm as the 
starting point for understanding popular representation in the administrative 
state.56 Influential public officials and scholars embraced Woodrow 
Wilson's vision of the President as the only "national voice" for the 
American people as a whole57 and argued that administrative law could pro-
mote majoritarian preferences more effectively by committing all 
discretionary rulemaking decisions to the President's managerial contro1.58 
The President, by virtue of his or her national election and accountability to a 
national constituency, would be better equipped to represent national 
majoritarian preferences than any political appointee or career civil servant. 59 
Therefore, by accepting direction from the White House on questions of 
regulatory policy, agencies could supposedly become more responsive to the 
54. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(explaining that an administrative rule needs to have a rational basis in the facts); cf Stewart, supra 
note 37, at 1775, 1777 ("[P]ublic participation in [informal rulemaking] proceedings may have little 
impact on agency policy determinations."). 
55. Bressman, supra note 43, at 485; Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" 
the Rulemaking Process, 42 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387-90 (1992); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: 
The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 
241 (1997). 
56. See Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy 
for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 343, 369 (2009) (describing how problems with the 
interest-group representation model led commentators to tum to an alternative model for the 
administrative state that emphasized majoritarianism's embrace of political accountability). 
57. See Dahl, supra note 32, at 360 ("There is no national party choice except that of President. 
No one else represents the people as a whole, exercising a national choice. . . . The nation as a 
whole has chosen him, and is conscious that it has no other political spokesman. His is the only 
national voice in affairs." (quoting WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 70, 200-{}3 (1908))); Jedediah Purdy, Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 
FORDHAM L. REv. 1837, 1849 (2009) (describing Wilson as crafting a "twentieth-century picture of 
the President as the unique voice of democratic self-rule, interpreter-in-chief of the electoral tumult 
that carried him into office"). 
58. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 21, at 59 (mentioning that the President is accountable to a 
nationwide electorate); Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 
84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1410-11 (1975) (reviewing arguments for why the President should have a 
broader role in regulatory decision making); Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 1180-81 (remarking on 
the growing consensus that the President is the party best equipped to break regulatory gridlock). 
59. See Brown, supra note 3, at 549 (claiming that independent agencies are independent from 
voters); Cutler & Johnson, supra note 58, at 1409 (arguing that elected officials are needed for 
efficacious economic regulation); id. at 1411 (arguing that the President is the most accountable 
elected official). 
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public will, while also energizing their administration, sparking innovation, 
improving interagency coordination, and rendering the administrative state as 
a whole more transparent to public scrutiny.60 As this Bickelian conception 
of presidential popular representation attracted supporters across the political 
spectrum, some commentators claimed "a growing degree of consensus for 
the proposition that all roads to regulatory reform lead to (or, perhaps more 
accurately, from) the President."61 
B. Operationalizing Presidential Administration 
Over time, presidents have taken proactive steps to operationalize 
presidential administration, pressing beyond their traditional oversight and 
advisory roles toward more robust managerial control over agency 
rulemaking.62 The modern history of presidential administration arguably 
begins in 1970, with President Nixon's creation of the OMB to coordinate 
interagency review of rulemaking proposals involving environmental 
protection, consumer protection, and public health and safety.63 Drawing on 
Nixon's example, Gerald Ford later created a Council on Wage and Price 
Stability to combat inflation by studying the fiscal impact of proposed 
regulations.64 Similarly, Jimmy Carter unveiled his own Regulatory Analysis 
Review Group to evaluate proposed regulations that were likely to have an 
60. See. e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580-81 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that a "unitary Executive" is "essential" to energize government decision making in a 
national-security context (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 146-47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961))); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727-32 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that a "unitary Executive" promotes individual liberty and uniform application of the law); 
BICKEL, supra note I, at 186 (arguing that the President should have the ability to dismiss 
subordinate Executive Branch officials at will because this would improve their responsiveness to 
the exigencies of his political responsibilities). 
61. Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 1180. 
62. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY PRESIDENT 304 (2008) 
(noting that some commentators argue "that the increase in discretionary, policymaking authority 
wielded by administrative agencies has strengthened the case in favor of the unitary executive"); 
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 11-
16 (1995) ("Almost since the birth of the modem administrative agency, American presidents have 
struggled to assert more centralized control over the regulatory state."); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, 
or "the Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 702 (2007) 
("Our most recent Presidents, if not their predecessors, seem to have been at pains to convey the 
impression that they are personally responsible for the conduct of domestic governance, to a degree 
that extends to the resolution or decision of particular administrative issues .... "). 
63. See Exec. Order No. 11,541,3 C.F.R. 140, 140 (1970}, reprinted in 31 U.S.C. § 501 (1994) 
(creating the Office of Management and Budget); James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the 
Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 
851, 863-64 (2001) (noting that during the Nixon Administration, other agencies were required to 
submit rules to the OMB, which served a coordinating function); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential 
Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 546-47 (1989) (explaining that 
agencies would submit new rules to the OMB, then "[t]he OMB staff integrated the comments and 
criticisms and transmitted them" back to the agencies). 
64. Percival, supra note 29, at 987; Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 14. 
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economic impact equal to or exceeding $100 million65 and created the Office 
of Infonnation Review and Analysis (OIRA), the OMB office now primarily 
responsible for White House regulatory review.66 Seeking to minimize 
burdensome federal regulations and facilitate interagency coordination, 
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush expanded executive 
oversight through more rigorous OMB review,67 Reagan's Presidential Task 
Force on Regulatory Relief, and Vice President Dan Quayle's Council on 
Competitiveness.68 Although President Clinton relaxed OMB review some-
what during his tenure, in many respects he claimed even greater oversight 
authority than his predecessors. For instance, Clinton famously issued over 
one hundred presidential orders directing agencies to adopt regulations tar-
geting social ills such as youth smoking and gun violence-no doubt seeking 
to compensate for his inability to advance his legislative agenda in an in-
creasingly hostile Congress. 69 Throughout these three decades of 
intensifying White House regulatory management, proponents of these 
changes argued that presidential participation was vital to safeguard the po-
litical legitimacy of federal regulation.7° Critics, on the other hand, warned 
that OMB review and the White House's "hidden-hand" influence under-
mined agency legitimacy by enabling interest-group capture and subverting 
congressionally mandated programs.71 
Upon taking office in 200 1, President Bush employed a similarly 
multifaceted strategy for influencing agency rulemaking, drawing on 
precedents set in previous administrations.72 What was truly remarkable 
65. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152, 154 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994); see 
also Percival, supra note 29, at 987 (describing the creation of the Regulatory Analysis Review 
Group). 
66. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, § 3503, 94 Stat. 2812, 2814-15 
(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (1994)); Percival, supra note 29, at 988. 
67. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 127 (1982) (declaring goals to increase agency 
accountability for and presidential oversight of the regulatory process). 
68. See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW 
SYSTEM 294-95 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing the apex of the "hidden-hand" approach to executive 
oversight of administrative agencies). 
69. See Kagan, supra note 20, at 2304-07 (arguing that President Clinton displaced 
administrative agency heads with a wide array of agency directives). As Dean Kagan has noted, 
Clinton's efforts to pursue his policy agenda through the administrative process began in earnest 
following the 1994 congressional elections, when Republicans gained a majority of seats in the 
House of Representatives, and accelerated in 1998, during the waning days of his postimpeachrnent 
tenure. !d. at 2283-84. 
70. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 43, at 490 (noting that the administrative state is 
purportedly legitimized by the recent increase in presidential control because agency decisions are 
brought under political and, therefore, popular control). 
71. See, e.g., Symposium, The Council on Competitiveness: Executive Oversight of Agency 
Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 297, 298 (1993-1994) (recommending that the public be given 
greater access to the review of agency rulemaking in order to further regulate independent-agency 
and executive-agency actions). 
72. See Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at AI 
(chronicling the Bush Administration's efforts to persuade and pressure agency officials behind the 
scenes). 
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about Bush's second term, however, was his Administration's effort to 
formalize White House control over agency rulemaking policy. In January 
2007, Bush issued Executive Order No. 13,422, amending a previous Clinton 
directive, which had required all agencies to designate an agency employee 
to serve as the agency's liaison, or "regulatory policy officer" (RPO), for 
OIRA review.73 Bush's executive order proclaimed that all RPOs must be 
political appointees, required agencies to obtain OMB approval of their 
RPOs, and thereby made RPOs de facto political gatekeepers for agency 
rulemaking actions. 74 Executive Order No. 13,422 also removed language 
from the previous Clinton directive, which had provided that RPOs "shall 
report to the agency head"75 and that the agency's regulatory plan "shall be 
approved personally by the agency head."76 While the practical import of 
these developments has been disputed, many critics argued that in Executive 
Order No. 13,422, Bush crossed the Rubicon dividing agency rulemaking 
discretion from presidential administration by formally supplanting 
administrators' statutory authority.77 
While the Obama Administration is still in its infancy, the President's 
first weeks in office sent mixed messages about his commitment to 
presidential administration. On the one hand, the President drew praise from 
critics of presidential administration when he promptly revoked Executive 
Order No. 13,422 and directed the OMB to develop recommendations for 
redesigning White House regulatory review. 78 On the other hand, President 
73. Exec. Order No. 13,422,3 C.F.R. 191 (2008). 
74. /d. 
75. Compare id. § 5(b) ("[E]ach agency head shall designate one of the agency's Presidential 
Appointees to be its Regulatory Policy Officer, advise OMB of such designation, and annually 
update OMB on the status of this designation."), with Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(2), 3 C.F.R. 
638, 645 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) ("[E]ach agency head shall designate a 
Regulatory Policy Officer who shall report to the agency head."). 
76. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,422 § 4(b), 3 C.F.R. at 191 ("Unless specifically authorized 
by the head of the agency, no rulemaking shall commence nor be included on the Plan without the 
approval of the agency's Regulatory Policy Office."), with Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(c)(l), 3 
C.F.R. at 642 ("[E]ach agency shall prepare a Regulatory Plan[, which] shall be approved 
personally by the agency head."). 
77. See Amending Executive Order 12,866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation? Part 
I and Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight of the Comm. on 
Science and Technology, I lOth Cong. 142 (2007) (statement of Brad Miller, Subcommittee 
Chairman) (noting that the order creates a new requirement of "market failure" for any agency to 
promulgate a rule, a requirement which follows an argument that Congress explicitly rejected); 
Amending Executive Order 12,866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation? Part 11: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 
I lOth Cong. 129 (2007) (statement of Peter L. Strauss) (asserting that Executive Order 13,422 
"diffuses political authority within the agency that [is generally] entrust[ ed] to the agency head"). 
78. See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Feb. 4, 2009) (revoking Executive Order 
No. 13,422 and requiring federal agencies to cease all enforcement thereof immediately); 
Memorandum of January 30, 2009: Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 5977 (Feb. 3, 2009) 
(requesting from OMB a set of recommendations related to federal regulatory review, comprising 
subjects such as guidance on transparency and encouraging public participation in the regulatory 
process). 
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Obama has emphasized his commitment to ongoing centralized review of 
agency regulation/9 and there are strong signs that he might seek even 
greater managerial control over the administrative state than his 
predecessors. For example, Obama has selected several leading proponents 
of presidential administration for prominent positions in his administration, 
including Dean Elena Kagan to serve as Solicitor General and Professor Cass 
Sunstein to head OIRA.80 He has also endeavored to centralize agency pol-
icy making by appointing White House policy "czars" over critical policy 
areas such as health-care reform, urban-affairs policy, energy, and climate 
change.81 These powerful administration officials have been tasked with di-
recting agency rulemaking from their White House offices without 
undergoing congressional confirmation and while operating behind the veil 
of executive privilege.82 As the White House continues to grapple with the 
current economic crisis, additional moves toward centralized administrative 
lawmaking are likely to follow. Thus, while it remains to be seen how far the 
Obama Administration will ultimately go in its efforts to operationalize 
presidential administration, the early returns portend a significant shift 
toward White House management of agency rulemaking. 
III. Proxy Representation 
To its defenders, presidential administration gives the electorate a 
powerful voice in federal regulation.83 Presidents serve as proxies for the 
people, translating general public preferences into specific directives to ad-
miniStrative agencies. The more influence presidents exercise in agency 
rulemaking, the theory goes, the more likely federal regulations will reflect 
79. Memorandum of January 30, 2009: Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. at 5977 (Feb. 3, 
2009). 
80. Sasha Issenberg, Obama Taps Harvard Law School Dean as Solicitor General, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nationlarticles/2009/0l/06/ 
obama_taps_harvard_Iaw_school_dean_as_solicitor_general/; Transition at OIRA: What Kind of 
Change?, OMB WATCH, Jan. 13,2009, http://www.ombwatch.org/node/3869. 
81. Igor Kossov, Byrd Calls Obama's Czars Dangerous, CBS NEWS.COM, Feb. 25, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/02/25/politics/politicalhotsheet/entry4828759.shtml; see also 
David J. Rothkopf, It's Official: Obama Creates More Czars than the Romanovs, FOREIGN POLICY, 
Apr. 16, 2009, http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/16/its_official_obama_ 
creates_more_czars_than_the_romanovs (identifying eighteen policy "czars" in the Obama 
Administration). 
82. See Peter Baker, And Now Let the Jockeying Begin, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. I, 2009, § WK, at I 
("More than any president in years, Mr. Obama came into office creating new White House czars 
and special envoys to supervise various hot-button issues at home and abroad, overlaying an 
additional set of actors upon a bureaucracy already scratchy about who's in charge."); Jonathan 
Martin, West Wing on Steroids in Obama W.H., POLITICO, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.politico.com/ 
news/stories/0 I 09/17908.htrnl ("Obama is moving to create perhaps the most powerful staff in 
modem history-a sort of West Wing on steroids that places no less than a half-dozen of his top 
initiatives into the hands of advisers outside the Cabinet."). 
83. Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for 
the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 343, 369 (2009). 
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majoritarian preferences and thereby advance the will of the people in agency 
rulemaking. 84 
Setting aside for the moment whether Bickelian majoritarianism offers a 
normatively attractive paradigm for conceptualizing the will of the people, it 
is apparent in any event that the majoritarian argument for presidential ad-
ministration fails on its own terms. Specifically, the majoritarian argument 
assumes that the general public possesses coherent preferences on particular 
questions of federal regulatory policy when this is plainly not the case. Nor 
is it self-evident that federal regulations would more likely satisfy majori-
tarian preferences (to the extent such preferences exist at all) when developed 
and refined under White House management. Sadly, the case for viewing the 
American presidency as a reliable proxy for the will of the people collapses 
all too quickly once its assumptions are exposed to close scrutiny. 
A. Three Fictions of Presidential Administration 
The idea that presidential administration promotes majoritarian 
preferences rests on three misconceptions about the President's relationships 
to voters and to the federal bureaucracy: the fiction of popular authorization, 
the fiction of popular accountability, and the fiction of presidential 
management. 
1. The Fiction of Popular Authorization.-Americans have become 
accustomed to hearing such appeals to election returns as reflecting popular 
authorization for their policy agendas. President John F. Kennedy famously 
declared that even a single-vote margin of victory would represent a decisive 
"mandate" for change.85 During the height of the Watergate scandal, 
President Richard Nixon likewise attempted to parry criticism by invoking 
his own electoral "mandate" from the 1972 presidential election. 86 More 
recently, news media have hailed the decisive electoral victories of 
George W. Bush in 2004 and Barack Obama in 2008 as representing "solid 
mandate[s]" for their respective policy agendas.87 For better or worse, this 
recurrent idea of the presidential mandate has become a central trope of our 
84. !d. 
85. Todd S. Purdum, All About the President, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at AI. 
86. KELLEY, supra note 32, at 99. 
87. See John F. Harris, For BliSh and GOP, a Validation, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2004, at AI 
("[President Bush] seemed to win validation for a campaign that unabashedly stressed conservative 
themes and reveled in partisan combat .... "); Doyle McManus & Janis Hook, Majority Win Could 
Make Second Term More Partisan, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at AI ("Bush can claim a solid 
mandate .... "); Brian Knowlton, Obama Vows to Cut Budget Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at 
A4 (quoting then President-elect Obama: "I don't think that there's any question that we have a 
mandate to move the country in a new direction."). 
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political mythology.88 At least with respect to questions of regulatory policy, 
however, the reality of modern electoral politics tells a very different story. 
Political scientists have long recognized that presidential elections can 
rarely, if ever, be construed as conferring genuine mandates for presidents to 
pursue particular regulatory policies.89 Perhaps the most obvious difficulty 
with interpreting election-night victories as mandate-conferring constitu-
tional moments is the nebulous relationship between presidential elections 
and majoritarian preferences. Presidents Kennedy, Clinton, and George W. 
Bush each reached the White House without winning a majority of the 
popular vote.90 Woodrow Wilson, the presidential mandate's intellectual 
champion, prevailed in 1912 with only 41.9% of the popular vote.91 
Abraham Lincoln won in 1860 with only 39.8%.92 If Americans truly 
desired to elect faithful proxies for popular preferences, the Electoral College 
system established in Article II, Section 1 and the Twelfth Amendment 
would hardly seem the most promising design. Indeed, the historical record 
suggests that the framers of the Constitution designed the indirect Electoral 
College system for presidential succession precisely to combat fears that 
popular elections might fall prey to tyrannical majoritarianism or 
demagoguery. 93 
Polling data from past presidential elections further undermine the 
mandate theory of popular authorization. Political scientists have found that 
most voters cast their votes based primarily upon "candidate centered" 
factors such as experience and temperament rather than "issue centered" 
factors such as a candidate's specific views on Social Security reform, tax 
88. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 246 (2005) ("The 
transformation of the presidency into a plebiscitary office is not a minor detail. It is a dominating 
fact of constitutional life."); Adler, supra note 23, at 875 ("In recent years, the Plebiscitary 
President-by which I mean a President who is, in some way, responsive to the judgments, 
preferences, beliefs or other attitudes of a majority of the citizenry-has loomed increasingly large 
in ... the legal literature on the separation of powers and administrative law."). 
89. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
90. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION 
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 82-83 (2006); see also Nzelibe, 
supra note 23, at 1261 ("[In] the fifteen presidential elections in the postwar period ... the winner 
failed to obtain a majority of the popular vote [in six elections], and in seven the opposition had a 
majority in at least one house of Congress."). 
91. LEVINSON, supra note 90, at 83. 
92. !d. 
93. See ACKERMAN, supra note 88, at 5 (asserting that the Electoral College was created as a 
means to prevent a "political opportunist" from achieving the presidency); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 
(James Madison), supra note 60, at 80-84 (arguing that a republic is superior to a pure democracy 
for the purposes of safeguarding the nation from the tyranny of majority factions); Jeffrey K. Tulis, 
The Two Constitutional Presidencies, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 91, 93-96 
(Michael Nelson ed., 1984) (discussing the historical evidence suggesting that the founders 
considered demagoguery and majority tyranny two major risks of pure democracy). 
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cuts, or foreign policy.94 Indeed, even the most decisive electoral victories 
are difficult to construe as conferring issue-centered popular mandates. As 
Robert Dahl has observed, the two presidential elections that most closely 
resembled landslide victories during the last half-century were President 
Lyndon B. Johnson's victory in 1964 and President Nixon's in 1972;95 in 
each case, however, only one in five voters cited issue-centered factors-as 
opposed to candidate-centered factors-as their primary reason for support-
ing their chosen candidates.96 It would be difficult, therefore, to dispute 
Dahl's conclusion that "no elected leader, including the president, is uniquely 
privileged to say what an election means-nor to claim that the election has 
conferred on the president a mandate to enact the particular policies the 
president supports. "97 
Even if Americans did cast their votes based solely on candidates' 
policy positions, presidents still would not be entitled to interpret national 
election returns as a sweeping popular mandate to direct agency rulemaking. 
The Constitution's framers generally viewed Congress-not the President-
as the best representative of popular opinion, believing that the collective 
wisdom of individual legislators would enable that body to "think, feel, 
reason, and act like" the people at large. 98 In contrast, the presidency was 
never well suited to serve as a "national voice" in the administrative state 
because no single public officer could reasonably be expected to reflect 
popular opinion in all matters of regulatory policy. As Peter Shane and oth-
ers have observed, presidential candidates pose a classic "bundled 
preferences" problem: elections require an up-or-down vote on candidates' 
aggregate platform, forcing voters to compromise some personal preferences 
in order to advance other deeply held commitments.99 When undertaking this 
calculus of compromise, particular questions of regulatory policy tend to 
have low salience for voters; indeed, polls suggest that even issue-minded 
voters are likely to cast their votes based on candidates' perceived 
"competence," "experience, record in public life, [or] strength of leadership" 
94. See Francis Rourke, Presidentializing the Bureaucracy: From Kennedy to Reagan, in THE 
MANAGERJAL PRESIDENCY 123, 126 (James P. Pfiffner ed., 1991) (suggesting that the "candidate 
centered" nature of presidential elections limits the ability of the president to claim a mandate). 
95. Dahl, supra note 32, at 364. 
96. /d. 
97. /d. at 366; see also KELLEY, supra note 32, at 4 ("The count of votes tells no one how far 
voters will follow the victorious candidate, or for how long, or in what direction."). 
98. IV JOHN ADAMS, Letter to John Penn, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 195, 205 (1851); see also I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787, at 141 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (asserting that the Legislature ought to be the "exact 
transcript" of society). 
99. Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of 
Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REv. 161, 197-99 (1994); see also Cynthia R. 
Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REv. 987, 998 (1997) (asserting that the bundling problem is stronger in a presidential election 
because the bundles of issues are greater in both size and complexity). 
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rather than their views on particular policies. 100 Most voters know far too 
little about American government generally-let alone the inner workings of 
the administrative state-to make informed decisions regarding presidential 
candidates' views on specific questions of regulatory policy. 101 As Barry 
Friedman has noted, the premise that the President will represent the will of 
the people "assumes there is such a thing as an identifiable majority will, 
when there is not."102 Political scientist John Ferejohn concurs: "Nothing 
strikes the student of public opinion and democracy more forcefully than the 
paucity of information most people possess about politics."103 Considered 
against this backdrop, the notion that national elections give the President a 
popular mandate to use particular means or pursue particular ends in admin-
istrative rulemaking is problematic, at best. 
My purpose in critiquing the fiction of presidential authorization is not 
to suggest that there is no correlation between candidates' campaign 
platforms and voter behavior in national elections. Clearly voters are not 
wholly indifferent to candidates' substantive views on the issues of the day, 
and these views in tum shape voter perceptions of candidates' wisdom and 
character. What the empirical record does suggest, however, is that 
presidential elections communicate far less information about majoritarian 
preferences than the proxy model of the American presidency assumes: 
although the voting public decides which candidate will be vested with 
presidential powers, they almost never communicate coherent directives 
regarding specific policy choices in specific regulatory fields. 104 
100. KELLEY, supra note 32, at 101, 107. 
I 0 I. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF 
TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES 9 (1992) ("Survey research has continued to 
confirm that Americans ... do not know very much about politics."); llya Somin, Political 
Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1291 (2004) (reviewing 
evidence of massive voter ignorance about politics); cf Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and 
Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1253, 1267 (2009) ("If citizens do not know about the existence 
of a policy issue, they will probably not have formed any meaningful preferences on its most 
desirable resolution."). 
102. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 583 , 629 (1993). 
But see PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note I 01, at 14 ("[P]ublic opinion as a collective phenomenon is 
nonetheless ... meaningful, and indeed rational in a higher, if somewhat looser, sense."). 
103. Ferejohn, supra note 32, at 3; see also B. DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, 
BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS: THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY 146 (1994) ("On the 
vast majority of issues dealt with by the bureaucracy, citizens have no specific demands or needs; 
they operate in a vague, impressionistic world, which leaves politicians with a wide zone of 
acceptance."); Sornin, supra note 101, at 1304 ("The most important point established in some five 
decades of political knowledge research is that the majority of American citizens lack even basic 
political knowledge."). 
104. By 1975, Bickel himself acknowledged the inadequacy of national elections as barometers 
for actual popular preferences: 
Elections, even if they are referenda, do not establish consent, or do not establish it for 
long. . . . Masses of people do not make clear-cut, long-range decisions. They do not 
know enough about the issues, about themselves, their needs and wishes, or about what 
those needs and wishes will appear to them to be two months hence. 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 16 (1975). 
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2. The Fiction of Presidential Accountability.-Advocates of 
presidential administration argue in the alternative that the President's unique 
political accountability qualifies him or her to serve as a proxy for majori-
tarian preferences in agency rulemaking. 105 In theory, presidential 
accountability could derive from various political pressures, including the 
ambition for reelection, the threat of impeachment, the influence of the 
President's political party, the need to maintain popular support for legisla-
tive initiatives, the desire to be followed by a like-minded successor, and 
concerns about the judgment of history. Citing each of these factors, 
supporters of presidential administration have argued that the President "has 
an incentive to steer national resources toward the 51% of the nation that last 
supported him (and that might support him again)."106 The presidency's 
"unitary power structure, its visibility, and its 'personality'" supposedly 
strengthen public accountability, mitigate the threat of factionalism, and en-
sure that the President will speak with a "national voice."107 
Over the last few years, this argument for presidential administration 
has been hotly contested across the legal academy. Glen Staszewski has 
characterized electoral accountability as "wildly unrealistic" because it re-
quires a degree of public engagement with federal administration that far 
exceeds actual practice. 108 Heidi Kitrosser and Peter Shane have shown that 
presidential control over information flow within the administrative state can 
obscure the President's influence, impeding public monitoring and thereby 
diluting political accountability. 109 Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the proxy 
model of popular representation, however, is the electorate's relative disen-
gagement from federal administrative governance. By all accounts, the vast 
majority of agency rulemaking actions simply fly under the public radar, 
eluding the attention of all but the most well-informed members of the 
electorate. 110 One cannot readily assume, therefore, that the public as a 
whole has any discernable majoritarian "will" about particular regulatory 
policy questions, much less that the President could readily discern and im-
plement that "will" in agency rulemaking proceedings. 
Even in cases where a president's actions attract intense public scrutiny, 
the problem of bundled preferences resurfaces to frustrate proxy 
105. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No 
Stranger, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 568 (1987) ("White House oversight places accountability 
precisely where it should be, namely, where the electorate can do something about it."). 
106. Calabresi, supra note 21, at 35. 
107. Kagan, supra note 20, at 2332; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 94-95. But see Heidi 
Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1770 (2009) (arguing that 
presidential administration increases the President's control over information and thereby 
undermines accountability). 
108. Staszewski, supra note 101, at 1266. 
109. Kitrosser, supra note 107, at 1770; Shane, supra note 99, at 204-09. 
110. See DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 32, at 79-82 (reporting statistics from the 
authors' own surveys showing that the American public is generally unaware of significant details 
of current and historical domestic policy). 
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representation. Voters may disapprove of a president's efforts to manage 
agency entitlement programs but reelect the president nonetheless based on 
sympathy for the president's views on foreign policy or social issues. 111 
Moreover, between elections the electorate has few effective tools to hold 
presidents accountable for even the most disastrous regulatory failures, 112 as 
illustrated vividly by the disastrous credit crisis of 2008 and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency's inept response to Hurricane Katrina. For 
all intents and purposes, Sandy Levinson's assessment would seem to be cor-
rect that a "noncriminal president" receives "an unbreakable four-year lease 
on the White House." 113 
Other political constraints fail to bridge the gap between presidential 
preferences and the popular will. Presidents Carter and George W. Bush fa-
mously took pride in bucking popular opinion, reasoning that the presidency 
must provide visionary leadership, not adhere slavishly to the latest polling 
data. 114 While President Clinton reportedly sought to adhere more closely to 
public opinion, 115 he also openly defied public opinion in several high-profile 
decisions. 116 Rifts between White House policy and public opinion are likely 
to multiply and expand during a president's second term, when he or she no 
longer needs to campaign for reelection and may more safely discharge po-
litical debts to ideological allies. 117 The political constraints on presidential 
policy making are hardly sufficient, therefore, to qualify the President as a 
reliable proxy for majoritarian preferences in agency rulemaking. 
3. The Fiction of Presidential Management.-The notion that 
presidents serve as reliable proxies for the body politic fails for yet another 
Ill. See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-administrative Impulse, I 03 
MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2078-80, 2134-35 (2005) ("[V)oters cannot, through the process of election, 
hold a public official accountable in any real sense."). 
112. See LEVINSON, supra note 90, at 116 (noting the difficulties in removing a president who 
is not criminal but merely incompetent, with reference to observations by William Schuerman). 
113. ld.atll7. 
114. See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Robert Y. Shapiro, The Politicization of Public Opinion: The 
Fight for the Pulpit, in THE SOCIAL DIVIDE 83, 96 (Margaret Weir ed., 1998) ("Carter advertised his 
defiance of public opinion as a sign of his responsible 'trustee' style of leading .. . . "); Bush Again 
Defends His Presidency, Posting of Katharine Q. Seelye to The Caucus: The Politics and 
Government Blog of the Times, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/0l/20/bush-again-
defends-his-presidency/?hp (Jan. 20, 2009, 19:52 EST) ("! never took an opinion poll to tell me 
what to think."). 
115. See James M. Perry, Clinton Relies Heavily on Pollster to Take Words Right out of the 
Public 's Mouth, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1994, at A16 (noting that George H.W. Bush spent $216,000 
on public-opinion polls in 1989 and I 990, whereas Clinton spent nearly ten times that amount in 
1993 alone). 
116. See Jacobs & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 98 (discussing Clinton' s "don't ask, don't tell" 
policy). 
117. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, A Last Push to Deregulate: White House to Ease Many Rules, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 31,2008, at AI (noting that "[t]he doors at the New Executive Office Building 
ha[d] been whirling with corporate officials and advisers pleading for relief or, in many cases, for 
hastened decision making" from the outgoing Bush Administration). 
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reason: centralizing policy-making authority in the presidency does not 
ensure that the President will personally manage agency rulemaking. In most 
cases, presidential management of agency rulemaking is a fiction that merely 
disguises a different kind of bureaucratic management. 118 The President can-
not feasibly review or respond to every agency rulemaking proposal 
personally; instead, he or she necessarily relies on the White House's ever-
expanding internal bureaucracy-including, but not limited to, OIRA-to 
oversee rulemaking proceedings across the administrative state. 119 Indeed, 
the more assertive presidents have been in seeking managerial control over 
the federal bureaucracy, the more they have been forced to bureaucratize the 
presidency itself. 120 The notion that presidential administration facilitates 
popular representation becomes far too attenuated as the President increas-
ingly delegates critical management functions to unelected White House 
staff. 
Recent empirical work underscores just how bureaucratized presidential 
administration has become. In one important study, Professors Lisa 
Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh conducted interviews with dozens of 
past and present Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) officials in an ef-
fort to discern the form and extent of White House participation in agency 
rulemaking. 121 Interviewees explained that the White House did not consis-
tently speak in a singular "national voice" on questions of public policy.122 
Instead, the EPA often received conflicting guidance on proposed rulemak-
ing actions from as many as nineteen different White House offices. 123 Far 
from providing univocal presidential policy direction, these internal tensions 
within the White House tended to foster "a climate of internal combat and 
coalition-building."124 The Bressman-Vandenbergh study also found that 
118. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 COLUM. L. REv. 1260, 1308 (2006) (noting that the President's limited ability to invest time 
into regulatory oversight gives agencies like OIRA free rein to make many regulatory decisions). 
119. See CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, PRESIDENCY BY PLEBISCITE: THE REAGAN-BUSH ERA IN 
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 85-86 (1993) (arguing that any Executive Branch administrative 
strategy must accept the reality that "no president can be expected to fully control the executive 
bureaucracy"); Bagley & Revesz, supra note 118, at 1277-80 (discussing the inefficacy ofOIRA's 
prompt letters as a means of regulatory reform); Thomas 0. Sargentich, Normative Tensions in the 
Theory of Presidential Oversight of Agency Rulemaldng, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 325, 326 (1993) 
("[Any] notion of national political accountability needs to be tempered by the reality that the 
president is generally not the person doing the overseeing."). 
120. See PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 164 (2007) (discussing the Volcker 
Commission's concern with the rapid increase in numbers of politically appointed bureaucrats in the 
federal government); James P. Pfiffner, Can the President Manage the Government?, in THE 
MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note 94, at 3, 17 (arguing that effective control over the 
expanding responsibilities of the Executive Branch increasingly requires delegation to cabinet 
appointees). 
121. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A 
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 63-64 (2006). 
122. !d. at 93. 
123. !d. at 49-50, 68. 
124. !d. at 68. 
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White House review of agency rulemaking tended to be "unsystematic" and 
"selective," depending primarily on "the interest of the particular officials 
involved" rather than the rigorous, systemic oversight that would ensure ade-
quate representation across the administrative state under a proxy model of 
presidential administration. 125 For this reason alone, the prevailing theory of 
presidential administration as a form of proxy representation remains 
unpersuasive in practice. 
B. The Pathologies of Presidential Administration 
Far from advancing majoritarian preferences in agency rulemaking, we 
might expect presidential administration to frustrate these preferences (to the 
extent they exist at all) in many contexts. One need look no further than 
public-opinion polls from the waning hours of George W. Bush's presidency 
to appreciate the profound disconnect that may develop between presidents 
and their constituents on general policy values and objectives. 126 
Centralizing rulemaking authority in the White House may facilitate 
countermajoritarian lawmaking by enabling presidents to cater to "narrow, 
sub-national political interests, including those playing major roles in [their] 
national campaigns." 127 This threat of White House capture is far from 
merely hypothetical: one influential study found that 56% of the meetings 
that OIRA held to discuss proposed or final agency rulemakings from 1981 
to 2000 involved only "narrow interests" (i.e., industry groups), as compared 
to just 10% that involved only "broad interests" (i.e., nonprofit public interest 
groups ). 128 Thus, the available evidence suggests that presidential 
administration does not reliably reduce the threat of countermajoritarian 
agency rulemaking and may, in fact, greatly exacerbate the problem. 
Presidential administration also raises the specter of regulatory 
entrenchment. If agencies were to adopt countermajoritarian regulations 
pursuant to presidential directives, these regulations would become cemented 
into federal law and would not be easily dislodged. To overturn unpopular 
125. /d. at 49. 
126. By November 2008, Bush's public disapproval rating peaked at 76%, the highest 
disapproval rating in six decades. Paul Steinhauser, Belief that Country Heading in Right Direction 
Is at All-Time Low, CNN POLITICS.COM, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/ 
11/10/bush.transition.poll/index.html. In February 2008, 71% of those polled disapproved of his 
handling of economic policy. Presidential Ratings-Issues Approval, 
GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poli/1726/Presidential-Ratings-Issues-Approval.aspx. In March 
2008, 91% of respondents indicated that the Bush Administration was either treading water or 
affirmatively weakening environmental protections. See Environment, GALLUP, http://www.gallup. 
com/poii/1615/Environment.aspx (reporting that of the sample polled, 52% believed environmental 
protection under the Bush Administration had been "kept about the same," while 39% believed 
protections have "weakened"). 
127. Thomas 0. Sargentlich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An Essay 
Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 27 (2007). 
128. Steven P. Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 858 (2003). 
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federal regulations, Congress would have to override the president's veto--a 
daunting proposition-or wait for a new president with different views to 
take office. Federal courts are ill-equipped to provide an alternative check on 
countermajoritarian presidential administration because White House direc-
tives are not ordinarily subject to judicial review and the mere unpopularity 
of proposed regulations is not, in and of itself, a basis for relief under the 
APA. 129 Thus, committing rulemaking authority to the President's formal 
control could entrench putatively countermajoritarian regulations against 
Congress's legislative override. 130 
To be fair, Bickel's distinction between maJontarian and 
countermajoritarian lawmaking may be too crude a standard for evaluating 
the performance of judges, legislators, presidents, agency administrators, and 
other state actors. 131 As Bickel himself conceded, the will of the people is 
best understood as a conceptually convenient "abstraction," not a readily 
ascertainable empirical reality. 132 Relatively few questions that arise in 
agency rulemaking-or in federal governance generally-attract sufficient 
public attention to generate coherent majoritarian preferences. Yet to the 
extent that it is ever possible to draw conclusions about public preferences 
from public-opinion polls or other indicators, it appears that there are many 
good reasons to abandon the notion that presidents are reliable proxies for the 
public will in agency rulemaking. 
In theory the United States could take measures to strengthen the link 
between presidential policy making and public preferences such as instituting 
binding national referenda on questions of regulatory policy or developing 
procedures for the electorate to censure or recall presidents who disregard 
public opinion. In practice, however, such reforms would require profound 
changes to our constitutional system and have little chance of success in the 
near term. Moreover, given the public's profound disengagement from the 
administrative process, it appears unlikely that even such radical innovations 
would ensure that presidential rulemaking was grounded in genuine majori-
tarian preferences. Simply put, the American presidency is ill-suited to serve 
as an oracle for the will of the people in the administrative state. 
IV. Fiduciary Representation 
If plebiscitary presidential administration is descriptively and 
prescriptively implausible, what consequences follow for the otherwise 
uncertain relationship between popular sovereignty and administrative 
129. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 118, at 1309. 
130. Of course, the credibility of a presidential-veto threat will depend upon contextual factors 
such as the regulation's relative visibility and political salience. 
131. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 102, at 582 (arguing that courts are not systematically less 
majoritarian than other branches of government). 
132. BICKEL, supra note I, at 16. 
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governance? In what sense might federal regulators represent the people in 
rulemaking proceedings, if not as proxies for majoritarian preferences? 
In this Part, I explore these questions from a new perspective by 
developing a theory of popular representation in administrative lawmaking 
based on the idea that government regulators serve as fiduciaries for the peo-
ple subject to their power. This model of popular representation draws on 
arguments first advanced in my recent article, Fiduciary Foundations of 
Administrative Law, 133 but extends these insights about the legal architecture 
of administrative law generally to further illuminate the fiduciary character 
of agency rulemaking authority in particular. To promote popular represen-
tation under the fiduciary model, agency regulators must respect the state's 
subjects as free and equal autonomous agents, and act to promote the public 
welfare, not necessarily the public will. 
To set the stage for this argument, this Part begins with a brief history of 
the fiduciary concept. I then explain how administrative governance may be 
conceptualized as a fiduciary relation between public institutions and the le-
gal beneficiaries of government action, and I identify six general principles 
that define and structure the state-subject fiduciary relation. Lastly, I 
consider how the fiduciary character of public administration might inform 
federal administrative law today by setting out three applications of the 
fiduciary model to agency rulemaking. 
A. Conceptualizing Fiduciary Representation 
As a first step toward reclaiming the fiduciary model of state authority, 
we will need to unpack the fiduciary concept and clarify how the fiduciary 
model might transcend mere metaphor and provide a meaningful theory of 
popular representation for contemporary administrative law. 
The fiduciary model of popular representation hearkens back to a 
tradition in political theory that predates Wilson's now-ascendant view of the 
presidency as the people's singular "voice" in national affairs. 134 Centuries 
before Wilson, the concept of state institutions and officials as "agents" or 
"trustees" for the people shaped the thought of luminaries such as Cicero, 135 
John Locke, 136 Edmund Burke, 137 James Madison, 138 and Alexander 
133. Criddle, supra note 35. 
134. See Avisheh Avini, The Origins of the Modern English Trust Revisited, 70 TUL. L. REv. 
1139, 1140 (1996) (noting that the origin of the English trust, or use, has been traced to four 
possible ancient sources). For Wilson's view, see Dahl, supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
135. See CICERO, Moral Goodness, in DE OFFICIIS, l.XXV.85, at 87 (Walter Miller trans., 
1997) (1913) ("[T]he administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must be 
conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one's care, not of those to whom it is entrusted."). 
136. See John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil 
Government (1690), in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU 87, 87 
(Ernest Barker ed., 1947) (asserting that legislative power is "only a fiduciary power to act for 
certain ends" and that "there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the 
legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them"). 
HeinOnline  -- 88 Tex. L. Rev. 467 2009-2010
2010] Fiduciary Administration 467 
Hamilton. 139 The fiduciary model was deeply influential among the 
American political elite during the founding period and throughout the early 
republic, as reflected in the republican vision "that each American had an 
equal part in forming the sovereignty of the United States, the body of politi-
cal power." 140 Leading intellectuals of the late nineteenth century such as 
John Stuart Mill and Frederick Maitland likewise characterized public pow-
ers as being held in "trust" by the state for the benefit of the nation as a 
whole. 141 Although the fiduciary concept of state legal authority is perhaps 
somewhat less pervasive in public discourse today than in times past, it 
137. See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, Discontents in the Kingdom, in BURKE'S POLITICS: SELECTED 
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE ON REFORM, REVOLUTION, AND WAR 3, 28 
(Ross J.S. Hoffinan & Paul Levack eds., 1949) (1770) ("The king is the representative of the 
people; so are the lords; so are the judges. They are all trustees for the people .... "). 
138. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 294 ("The federal 
and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with 
different powers and designed for different purposes."). 
139. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 60, at 397 ("The 
delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of 
every man engaged in the administration of public affairs speak for themselves."). 
140. JEDEDIAH PURDY, A TOLERABLE ANARCHY: REBELS, REACTIONARIES, AND THE MAKING 
OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 59 (2009); see also PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IV ("[A]ll power 
[is] ... derived from, the people; therefore all officers of government, whether legislative or 
executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them."); PURDY, supra, at 
10 ("[This] idea that power flowed from the whole political community to the government, which 
held it in 'trust,' was central to American political language in the nineteenth century."); Andrew 
Jackson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1833) (referring to the office as a "sacred trust" that he 
"receive[ d) from the people"); James Madison, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1809) (referring to 
his "awful sense of the trust to be assumed"); James Madison, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 
1813) (invoking "the momentous period at which the trust has been renewed"); James Monroe, First 
Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1817) (referring to the need for a President to hold "a just estimate of 
the importance of the trust and of the nature and extent of its duties" and to American government 
officials as "the faithful and able depositaries of their trust" that of the American people). 
141. See Frederick William Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in SELECTED ESSAYS !51, 220 
(H.D. Hazeltine et al. eds., 1936) ("[W]hen new organs of local government are being 
developed, ... it is natural ... that their governmental powers should be regarded as being held in 
trust. Those powers are, we say, 'intrusted to them,' or they are 'intrusted with' those powers."); 
John Stuart Mill, Representative Government, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 230, 321 (1947) (describing public power as a "trust" that must be "fulfill[ed]"); see 
also Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577 (1900) (describing administrative agencies as "mere 
agencies or trusts"); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879) ("The power of governing is a 
trust committed by the people to the government. . . . The people, in their sovereign capacity, have 
established their agencies for the preservation of the public health and the public morals, and the 
protection of public and private rights."); ERNEST BARKER, ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT 53 (1945) 
(describing the representative parliament as "the trustee which the nation has authorized to act on its 
behalf; and it exercises sovereign power, under the terms of the trust, for the nation"); HENRY J. 
FORD, REPRESENTATIVE GoVERNMENT 146 (1924) (describing representative government as "[b]y 
its essential nature ... a system of trusteeship"); HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF 
REPRESENTATION 128 (1967) ("Representation certainly is, as many writers have pointed out, a 
fiduciary relationship, involving trust and obligation on both sides."). 
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continues to shape how federal and state courts conceptualize the role of 
public officers in our government. 142 
Historically, the fiduciary concept has its roots in private law 
paradigms. Beginning in the twelfth century and continuing on throughout 
the Middle Ages, 143 the law of England recognized the "use" or "trust" as a 
legal device for authorizing certain individuals to manage assets or perform 
other services subject to strict legal and ethical duties of fidelity to their 
beneficiaries' interests. 144 Over time, Anglo-American courts extended the 
fiduciary concept to an expanding family of legal relations, including agency, 
partnerships, guardianships, receiverships, corporations, security 
arrangements, franchises, and, more recently, certain confidential counseling 
relations such as the attorney-client and doctor-patient relationships. 145 
What distinguishes fiduciary relations such as these from other legal or 
extra-legal relationships? At their most basic level, all fiduciary relations 
share a common structure: the law entrusts a party (the fiduciary) with dis-
cretionary administrative authority to manage the legal or practical interests 
of another party (the beneficiary). 146 Within the fiduciary relation, the 
beneficiary becomes dependent upon the fiduciary to pursue her interests, 
and she is unable, either legally or practically, to protect herself fully against 
the abuse of fiduciary power. 147 The law therefore obligates the fiduciary to 
exercise entrusted discretionary power in furtherance of legally authorized 
purposes 148 and with due care for the beneficiary's interests. 149 In cases 
142. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airport Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise, 501 
U.S. 252, 272 (1991) (describing government institutions as fiduciaries for the people); Nuesse v. 
Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (describing the fiduciary nature of public legal authority 
as a "living tenet of our society"); Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433 (N.J. 1951) 
(describing public officials as fiduciaries with an "inescapable obligation to serve the public with 
the highest fidelity"); Black River Regulating Dist. v. Adirondack League Club, 121 N.E.2d 428, 
433 (N.Y. 1984) ("[T]he power conferred by the Legislature is akin to that of a public trust to be 
exercised not for the benefit or at the will of the trustee but for the common good."). 
143. See Avini, supra note 134, at 1143-47 (describing the creation and employment of the use 
in England prior to the enactment of the Statute of Uses in 1535, which aimed to convert all 
equitable uses into legal estates); id. at 1150 (referencing postmortem transfers of land in twelfth-
century England). 
144. See id. at 1143-47 (reviewing the early applications of the use in England, including by 
individuals to convey land to the clergy; by tenants to avoid burdens imposed by the lord or by the 
law; and by individuals to circumscribe constraints imposed on the conveyance oflegal estates). 
145. See Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 199, 216-18 (1992) (explaining that the fiduciary duty applies to doctors and 
lawyers and has been incorporated into the law of agency, partnerships, and business organizations, 
as well as regulation of confidential relationships such as doctor-patient and lawyer-client). 
146. See Paul Baron Miller, Essays Toward a Theory of Fiduciary Law 146 (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the author) (defining the fiduciary relationship as "one in which one 
person-the fiduciary-enjoys discretionary power to set or pursue the practical interests of 
another-the beneficiary"). 
14 7. See id. at 178 (describing the "core structural qualities" of fiduciary relations as 
"inequality of power, dependence, and vulnerability"). 
148. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 808 & n.48 (1983); see also 
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. I, 10 (1976) ("The extent of the 
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where fiduciaries have multiple beneficiaries, the duty of loyalty requires 
even-handed treatment among beneficiaries. 150 
To facilitate adherence to these duties, fiduciary law also contains 
prophylactic, information-forcing rules, which promote transparency and 
facilitate monitoring and enforcement. 151 Fiduciaries are required to "keep 
clear and accurate" records 152 and give beneficiaries a complete account of 
their performance upon request. 153 Fiduciaries must comply with these re-
quirements whether or not beneficiaries are able to show they have suffered a 
distinct injury. 154 These ancillary duties of disclosure are necessary to ensure 
fiduciaries' adherence to their primary fiduciary duties. 155 
Evan Fox-Decent and I have argued that the fiduciary relation's legal 
basis is best perceived through Immanuel Kant's conception of parent-<:hild 
fiduciary relations in The Doctrine of Right. 156 According to Kant, legal 
rights reflect a person's moral capacity to place others under legal 
obligations. 157 Each person has an innate right to as much freedom as can 
reasonably coexist with the freedom of others. 158 The function of law on this 
account is to enshrine rights within a regime of equal freedom in which 
persons cannot unilaterally impose the terms of interaction on others. 159 
Turning to the parent-<:hild relationship, Kant explains the moral basis 
of parents' fiduciary obligation to their children as a consequence of parents' 
unilateral creation of a person "endowed with freedom" who cannot survive 
fiduciary's discretion is demarcated, and the fiduciary obligation is imposed in order to compel a 
proper exercise of that discretion within the scope of the authority thus delineated."). 
149. See Nagel v. Todd, 45 A.2d 326, 327 (Md. 1946) (stating that a fiduciary must "'act 
primarily for the benefit of [his beneficiaries], in matters connected with his undertaking"' (quoting 
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1928)); Cristallina, S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods 
Int'l, 117 A.D.2d 284, 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (indicating that agents have an implied duty to 
use their best efforts for their principals); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) ('The 
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care and skill as 
a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property."). 
150. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928) (describing this "rule of undivided 
loyalty" as "relentless and supreme"). 
151. See, e.g., 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS§ 172, at 452- 54 (William 
Franklin Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987) (describing the openness and diligence of trustees that courts 
require with regard to accounts of beneficiaries). 
152. !d. 
153. !d. 
154. Cf Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 456, 495 (2004) 
(suggesting that compliance with the requirements of common law and statutory schemes such as 
Sarbanes-Oxley is integral to meeting the good faith standard independent of actionable harm). 
155. See 2A SCOTT, supra note 151, § 172, at 452-56 (noting that one of the reasons for 
requiring proper records is to prevent the trustee from hiding misconduct). 
156. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 352-54; Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 276-81. 
157. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 353. 
158. !d. 
159. !d. 
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without their support. 160 Once parents in the exercise of their freedom bring 
a child into the world, recognition of the child's equal freedom as a "citizen 
of the world," coupled with the child's practical or legal inability to consent 
to the relationship of dependence, places parents under a fiduciary obligation 
to provide for the child's basic security by making "the child content with his 
condition so far as they can."161 Parents' fiduciary obligations to their chil-
dren thus reflect the constraints that a child's innate dignity as a free and 
autonomous moral agent places on parents' equal freedom. 162 
Extending Kant's theory of innate right beyond familial relations, the 
same demands of rightful conduct vis-a-vis children extend likewise to other 
fiduciary relationships such as trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal, 
corporation-shareholder, and lawyer-client. 163 Although most beneficiaries 
are not children or incompetents and ought not to be treated as such, all bene-
ficiaries are vulnerable to the fiduciary's abuse of legally entrusted 
administrative power over their legal and practical interests. 164 Absent the 
law intervening to mediate fiduciary relations, beneficiaries would be subject 
to intolerable domination-the fiduciary's capacity to exercise administrative 
power arbitrarily. 165 The law therefore authorizes fiduciaries to exercise ad-
ministrative powers on behalf of their beneficiaries, but subject to the strict 
limitations that arise from beneficiaries' vulnerability and moral capacity to 
place the fiduciary under legal obligations. 166 
As in any form of representation, fiduciaries are bound to act 
deliberately, not reflexively. "When we act for someone else we may not act 
on impulse," observes Hannah Pitkin. 167 Instead, "we ought to have reasons 
for what we do, and be prepared to justify our actions to those we act for, 
even if this accounting or justification never actually takes place."168 The 
deliberate character of representation thus involves a formal principle of 
justifiability, which informs both proxy representation and fiduciary 
representation, albeit in different ways. In proxy representation, the proxy is 
160. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 98-99 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) 
(1797). 
161. !d. 
162. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 354. 
163. !d. at 349. 
164. !d. 
165. See HENRYS. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE 
ENDS OF POLICY 34 (2002) ("Domination is the capacity to make people's lives or situations worse 
by arbitrarily imposing duties on them, or by arbitrarily purporting to impose duties on them."). See 
generally PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 51 (1997) 
(developing a republican theory of freedom as "non-domination"). 
166. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 352 (describing the administrative power of a 
state as being within the confmes of a fiduciary obligation due to the vulnerability of its subjects). 
167. PITKIN, supra note 141, at 119. 
168. !d.; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United 
States, and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, I 04 (2007) ("[To] 
be subject to administrative authority that is unreasoned is to be treated as a mere object of the law 
or political power, not a subject with independent rational capacities."). 
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expected to identify and implement the principal's actual preferences. 169 A 
fiduciary representative, on the other hand, need not always conform her 
actions to her beneficiaries' preferences. 170 Indeed, it is precisely the 
discretionary character of a fiduciary's administrative power (due typically 
to the beneficiary's absence, incompetence, or abdication of authority) that 
distinguishes fiduciary relations from other forms of representation. 171 When 
exercising these discretionary powers, a fiduciary must independently assess 
what course of action will best promote her beneficiaries' welfare. 172 While 
beneficiaries' actual preferences are germane to this assessment and must not 
be dismissed arbitrarily, they are not always dispositive for the fiduciary as 
they would be for a proxy. 173 This is so, in part, because the fiduciary is of-
ten expected to draw on superior information, experience, or expertise. 174 
The fiduciary may also have multiple beneficiaries with competing percep-
tions of the common good. 175 To honor beneficiaries' equal dignity as free 
and autonomous agents and thereby to avoid domination, the law directs that 
a fiduciary must be prepared to explain how her actions are reasonably cal-
culated to promote her beneficiaries' welfare, not merely her own. 176 Thus, 
unlike a proxy, the fiduciary's signature duty is one of loyalty to her 
beneficiaries' legitimate interests. 177 
Fiduciary relations' other-regarding purpose distinguishes fiduciary 
representation from proxy representation in another important sense: 
fiduciary representation is not only deliberate but also deliberative. To sat-
isfy the duty of care, a fiduciary representative must exercise her 
administrative discretion through a deliberative process, which includes, at a 
minimum, clarifying the nature of the problem or opportunity, discerning the 
range of permissible actions, evaluating the pros and cons of each alternative, 
and developing an objectively reasonable rationale for the action taken. 178 
169. See PITKIN, supra note 141, at 90 ("The representative [in political representation] is not to 
give new opinions to his constituents, but to reflect those they already have."). 
170. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text. 
173. See Paul B. Miller & Charles Weijer, Fiduciary Obligations in Clinical Research, 34 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 424, 433 (2006) ("True exercise of discretion requires the fiduciary to make free 
and independent judgments . ... "). 
174. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1399, 1413 (2002) (highlighting the "superiority" of the fiduciary as a quality courts use to infer a 
fiduciary relationship). 
175. See, e.g., Katherine Traylor Schaffzin, Eyes Wide Shut: How Ignorance of the Common 
Interest Doctrine Can Compromise Informed Consent, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 71, 94-95 (2008) 
(describing attorneys' fiduciary duties to multiple parties in common representation situations and 
the conflicts that may arise). 
176. Cf Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 814 (1983) (discussing the 
ability of a principal to monitor a fiduciary by requiring the fiduciary to report his activities). 
177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 8.01 (2006). 
178. Cf Brehm v. Eisner (Disney II), 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("Irrationality is the outer 
limit of the business judgment rule." (footnote omitted)); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 
HeinOnline  -- 88 Tex. L. Rev. 472 2009-2010
472 Texas Law Review [Vol. 88:441 
The fiduciary representative must give consideration to relevant experience 
or expertise, be it the fiduciary's own expert judgment or the consultation of 
other specialists.179 She may not arbitrarily neglect or ignore readily accessi-
ble sources of information that may be important to her decision. 180 Above 
all, the principle of formal justifiability dictates that a fiduciary's exercise of 
discretionary power must follow prudent and rational deliberation, and the 
fiduciary must provide a complete and satisfactory accounting of her stew-
ardship upon request. 181 Reasoned deliberation addresses the threat of 
administrative domination and serves the purpose of all fiduciary relations-
the pursuit of the beneficiary's welfare. Fiduciary representation thus offers 
a robust alternative to proxy representation, reframing representation as the 
exercise of lawfully entrusted administrative authority to manage another 
person' s legal or practical interests for their benefit. 
B. Fiduciary Representation in the Administrative State 
Against this background, the traditional republican conception of state 
officers and institutions as agents and trustees for the people comes into 
sharper focus. 182 The idea that public officials serve as fiduciary representa-
tives for persons subject to their power comports with the constitutive 
features of fiduciary relationships generally. 183 All agents and instrumentali-
ties of the state-including the primary legislative, executive, and judicial 
institutions-are vested by law with discretionary administrative powers to 
(Del. 1985) ("Under the business judgment rule there is no protection for directors who have made 
'an unintelligent or unadvised judgment."' (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-W. Glass Co., 167 A. 831, 
833 (Del. Ch. 1933))). 
179. See Patricia A. Vlahakis, Takeover Law and Practice 2008, in 40TH ANNUAL INST. ON 
SEC. REGULATION, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 1087, 1119 
(2007) (describing consultation of legal and financial experts as part of the duty of care). 
180. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993) (holding that directors 
violated their duty of care because they did not "adequately inform" themselves of all reasonably 
available material information before approving a merger agreement). There is some debate among 
legal scholars over whether the duty of care is properly characterized as a fiduciary duty or a tort 
duty. Compare Steven Elliot, Fiduciary Liability for Client Mortgage Fraud, 13 TR. L. INT'L 74, 
76 (1999) (arguing that even those who stand in a fiduciary relationship with another may be liable 
for tort duties), with Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc'y v. Mothew, [1998] EWHC (Ch) I, [16C]-[17F] 
(Eng.) (endorsing the view that the duty of care owed by a fiduciary is not unique to the fiduciary 
relationship), and Peter Birks, The Content of the Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 3, 33-37 
(2000) (arguing that there is not a separate fiduciary duty of care). 
181. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, Ill n.9 (Del. Ch. 
1986) ("[A] decision by disinterested directors following a deliberative process may still be the 
basis for liability if such decision cannot be ' attributed to any rational business purpose,' or is 
'egregious."' (citations omitted)); Vlahakis, supra note 179, at 1119 ("The core of the duty of care 
may be characterized as the directors' obligation to act on an informed basis after due consideration 
of the relevant materials and appropriate deliberation."). 
182. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 60, at 239 (describing 
governments as "agents" and "trustees" for the public). 
183. See Criddle, supra note 35, at 135 (drawing comparisons between the features of fiduciary 
law and administrative law). 
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make, interpret, or enforce laws for the citizenry. 184 These powers relate 
primarily to objectives that, in Lincoln's words, private parties "need to have 
done, but can not do, at all, or can not, so well do, for themselves-in their 
separate, and individual capacities."185 Because public powers are entrusted 
solely to the state by law and cannot be exercised by private parties without 
legal authorization, the public depends upon government officers to exercise 
their powers in the public interest, and the public is uniquely vulnerable to 
officers' inept or unreasonable misuse of administrative power. All agents 
and instrumentalities of the state are therefore subject to fiduciary duties in 
discharging their responsibilities. 186 
Popular representation under the fiduciary model does not depend upon 
electoral authorization or accountability, nor does it seek to guarantee that 
public officials satisfy the will of the people. Instead, fiduciary representa-
tion acknowledges that the will of the people is usually an abstraction 
without a reliable referent in the real world. As such, the fiduciary model 
focuses on public officers' fidelity to their legal mandates and the public 
welfare, as well as satisfaction of the basic duties of care and loyalty. For 
example, a police officer may be said to represent the people when making 
an arrest if the arrest serves a lawfully authorized purpose, is not an abuse of 
discretion under the particular circumstances, and is not tainted by a self-
interested motive or discriminatory intent. A federal district judge likewise 
represents the people when sentencing a criminal defendant if she demon-
strates that the sentence is fundamentally fair and reasonable in light of the 
evidence before the court. 187 Similarly, under the fiduciary model, a member 
of Congress may represent the people if she supports controversial legislation 
based on her rational assessment of the public interest-even if she is unable 
to divine any coherent public will concerning the legislation. 188 In each of 
these contexts, popular representation rests on the fiduciary's satisfaction of 
her basic obligations as fiduciary for the people subject to her administrative 
powers. Whether public officials are elected by, or directly accountable to, 
the electorate might strengthen or weaken the case for popular representation, 
but neither of these considerations is a necessary criterion for fiduciary 
representation as long as the fiduciary faithfully exercises her entrusted 
powers. 
184. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 352. 
185. Abraham Lincoln, To Do for the People What Needs to Be Done (July I, 1854), in 
LINCOLN ON DEMOCRACY 63, 64 (Mario M. Cuomo & Harold Hozer eds., 1990). 
186. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 352 (arguing that because private parties 
cannot exercise public powers "legal subjects are peculiarly vulnerable to public authority" and 
therefore are owed a fiduciary obligation). 
187. See Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications, Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE L.J. 1070, 1103-
07 (2008) (comparing private fiduciaries and public officials, and explaining that public officials 
must be prepared to justifY their actions according to legal authorization). 
188. See Dimitrios Kyritsis, Representation and Waldron's Objection to Judicial Review, 26 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 733, 743 (2006) (arguing that legislators ought to "reconstruct from 
[public preferences] the best possible vision of the just and well-governed polity"). 
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Dimitrios Kyritsis has argued that the fiduciary model of state legal 
authority is preferable to proxy representation in the legislative process 
because it "more accurately reflects ... the practice of political 
representation, as we know it," and thus "better captures our conception of 
representation." 189 Public preferences in republican democracies "[are] 
neither immutable nor inviolable," he observes. 190 Instead, voters rely on 
legislators to clarify what is at stake in proposed legislation, and legislators in 
tum shape public preferences. 191 The dynamic "relationship between the 
representative and the constituents he represents is not one of identity 
between the acts and decisions of the former and the wishes and views of the 
latter," as would be the case in proxy representation. 192 Rather, legislators 
necessarily exercise a degree of discretion independent of their constituents' 
actual preferences: 
What is important for the legitimacy of legislative decisions is that 
legislators reconstruct from [the public's] wishes and convictions the 
best possible vision of the just and well-governed polity, in which the 
interests of individuals deserve a place. . . . Even where their actions 
in their official capacity are in line with what their constituents happen 
to believe and want, the ground for [legislators'] actions is not that 
their constituents want them so to act. Rather, the ground is the more 
complex idea that they think that certain wishes and convictions of 
their constituents fit into a morally attractive vision of the just and 
well-ordered polity. 193 
According to Kyritsis, the legitimacy ofthe legislative process depends upon 
legislators deliberating collectively and with the public to develop laws that 
promote the public interest. 194 This fiduciary conception of the legislator-
constituent relationship captures how legislators actually behave, and ought 
to behave, in a polity characterized by malleable preferences and pervasive 
disengagement from the political process. 195 
189. /d.; see also Adler, supra note 23, at 879 n.334 (noting the tension in democratic theory 
between the president as "trustee" and "delegate"). 
190. Kyritsis, supra note 188, at 743. 
191. /d. at 744-45. 
192. /d.; see also Staszewski, supra note 101, at 1272 (observing that in one study "less than 
twenty percent of survey respondents could identify a single vote by their representative in the 
House over the preceding two years"). 
193. Kyritsis, supra note 188, at 743; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) 
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (discerning in the Constitution an "unmistakable expression 
of a determination that legislation by the national Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and 
deliberative process"). 
194. See Kyritsis, supra note 188, at 743 (explaining that the legitimacy of legislative decisions 
sterns from both the public's wants and the legislator's personal interpretation of how those wants 
will best be satisfied). 
195. The fiduciary account helps to explain how elected representatives may be understood to 
represent the public as a whole rather than simply the plurality of voters who elected them. 
Elections respect individuals' moral dignity as free and equal beneficiaries of state power by 
offering an opportunity to participate in the constitutive process of governance, but elections are not 
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The fiduciary conception of popular representation is particularly well-
suited to agency lawmaking in the modem administrative state. 196 When 
Congress entrusts administrative authority to administrative agencies, it tasks 
federal regulators with serving the interests of their designated statutory 
beneficiaries. Agencies necessarily exercise discretion in rulemaking be-
cause Congress lacks the time and resources to explore all of the potential 
ramifications of its general delegations. 197 The entrustment of discretionary 
lawmaking power to administrative agencies therefore engenders a relation-
ship in which the public depends upon federal regulators to employ their 
discretionary powers in the public interest and stands in a position of acute 
vulnerability to the abuse of administrative power. Moreover, as in the leg-
islative process, most voters do not monitor agency activities closely and 
lack coherent, informed preferences concerning administrative lawmaking. 198 
Just as constituents rely on their legislative representatives to educate them 
about lawmaking initiatives and act in their interest, the electorate likewise 
relies on administrative agencies to bring their expertise to bear in studying 
regulatory problems, to educate the public on the stakes of regulation, and 
ultimately to employ their rulemaking powers fairly and reasonably in 
furtherance of the general public welfare. 199 
To ensure that administrative lawmaking honors the moral dignity of 
individual subjects, the fiduciary principle demands that agencies employ a 
decision-making process that respects all persons as free and equal autono-
mous agents. In this respect, the fiduciary model closely resembles Henry 
Richardson's idea of democratic autonomy, which emphasizes public 
participation in "collective reasoning about public ends, the ends of 
an "infallible normative touchstone." RICHARDSON, supra note 165, at 58-59, 60. As Henry 
Richardson has observed, majoritarian domination may be just as great a threat to individual 
freedom as bureaucratic domination, unless it is "constrained to operate within fair procedures that 
respect persons as free and equals and provide adequate protection for their fundamental rights and 
liberties." !d. at 47. 
196. See generally Criddle, supra note 35, at 135-72 ("Fiduciary law's core elements of 
entrustment, residual control, and fiduciary duty increasingly capture the 'deep structure' of 
administrative law."); ABA Comm. on Gov't Standards, Keeping Faith: Government Ethics & 
Government Ethics Regulation, 45 ADMIN. L. REv. 287, 291-92 (1993) (characterizing government 
as a "fiduciary, or steward, ... to whom power is given in order that his knowledge and skill can be 
brought to bear for the benefit of another" and emphasizing "the entrusting of power by 'We, the 
People' to those who govern for us"). 
197. See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 
89 GEO. L.J. 97, 109 (2000) (explaining that the public delegates power to legislators because 
members of the public generally lack the time or expertise to make informed policy choices, and 
legislators likewise delegate decision-making power to administrative agencies due to a lack of time 
and insufficient knowledge of particular areas oflaw). 
198. See id. at 106-07 (developing a public-choice theory of administrative lawmaking based 
upon similar premises). 
199. See id. at 118 ("[W]hat counts is not agency adherence to congressional wishes; rather, the 
agency has an incentive to do a good job in order to please the principal's principal-the public."); 
cf RICHARDSON, supra note 165, at 41 (noting that reliance on another's superior knowledge or 
experience can itself constitute domination). 
HeinOnline  -- 88 Tex. L. Rev. 476 2009-2010
476 Texas Law Review [Vol. 88:441 
policy."200 Both models of the administrative state emphasize the liberal 
ideals of freedom and equality, the rationalist ideal of reasoned deliberation, 
and the republican ideal of inclusive deliberation as a safeguard against 
domination.201 The primary distinction between fiduciary administration and 
"democratic autonomy" lies in Richardson's assertion that it is "necessary" 
for "individuals [to] participate sufficiently in the political process for them 
to count as deciding, together, what ought to be done."202 While the fidu-
ciary model supports affording the public an opportunity to participate in 
agency deliberation,203 the absence of actual public participation does not 
ipso facto delegitimize agency lawmaking as impermissible domination.204 
Indeed, it is precisely the public's disengagement from the rulemaking 
process-coupled with its incapacity to wield public regulatory powers and 
its vulnerability to regulators' abuse of discretion-that triggers the fiduciary 
principle.205 The question then becomes whether administrative law ade-
quately mediates the state-subject fiduciary relation by channeling 
administrative discretion through principles or procedures that ensure that 
individual subjects are treated as free and equal autonomous persons. 
C. Fiduciary Representation in Agency Rulemaking: Six Principles 
To safeguard beneficiaries against domination, six principles define and 
structure fiduciary representation: purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, 
fairness, reasonableness, and transparency.206 These six principles are 
common to all fiduciary relations, but they have particular salience as 
relational constraints on federal rulemaking powers. 
200. RICHARDSON, supra note 165, at 19. 
201. See id. at 242-46 (reviewing the four component ideals of democratic autonomy and 
analyzing existing democracies' realization of these ideals). 
202. /d. at 66. 
203. See id. at 247 (arguing that the populist ideal of democracy requires that citizens 
participate in all lawmaking, including agency rulemaking). 
204. See Russell Hardin, Deliberation: Method, Not Theory, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: 
ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 103, 116 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999) ("Because of 
the sheer size of the polity, citizens have little interest in participating and, given this fact, even less 
interest in being well enough informed to participate well [in politics]. . . . [T]o hope, expect, or 
wish for citizens to do much deliberating is unreasonable and forlorn."). 
205 . See ABA Comm. on Gov't Standards, supra note 196, at 292 (describing citizens as 
increasingly "dependent upon public employees for help in understanding, and effectively 
communicating with, their government" and characterizing those entrusted with public power as 
being under a duty of "Scrupulous Integrity" in order to "avoid circumstances that create the 
opportunity for interest or bias to exert their corrosive influence" in discussing the requisite qualities 
of ethical government service). 
206. See generally Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 360-68 (discussing these principles 
of fiduciary representation in the context of human rights law); Robert G. Natelson, The 
Government as Fiduciary: A Practical Demonstration from the Reign of Trajan, 35 U. RICH. L. 
REv. 191, 211-32 (2001) (comparing the Roman Emperor Trajan's form of government to what is 
now thought of as a fiduciary concept of government through the lens of four "central trust 
obligations"). 
HeinOnline  -- 88 Tex. L. Rev. 477 2009-2010
2010] Fiduciary Administration 477 
First, to satisfy the fiduciary model of popular representation, federal 
regulators must ensure that all exercises of rulemaking authority are consis-
tent with Congress's statutorily designated public-regarding purpose.207 
Although congressional legislative directives are often extremely broad, 
expressing only vague "intelligible principles" to guide agency action,208 
these directives are binding on federal regulators in rulemaking 
proceedings.209 When specifying the directives embodied in congressional 
legislation, federal regulators may not substitute their own preferred purposes 
for those authoritatively designated by Congress.210 
The second and third principles of fiduciary representation-integrity 
and solicitude-arise from the paradigmatic fiduciary duty of loyalty. The 
principle of integrity dictates that federal regulators must refrain from ex-
ploiting their entrusted authority and the public's dependence and 
vulnerability for personal or institutional self-aggrandizement. They may 
not, for example, use their regulatory powers to appropriate public resources 
for personal gain or expand an agency's jurisdiction without congressional 
authorization.211 Instead, regulators must act with due solicitude toward the 
legitimate interests of their statutory beneficiaries, treating them as ends in 
themselves and never as mere means.Z 12 Since public preferences are rele-
vant to the public interest, solicitude obligates regulators to give reasonable 
consideration to public preferences alongside other factors relevant to the 
public interest. Agencies must also avoid any arbitrary delay or inaction that 
could result in the squandering of valuable public resources or 
opportunities. 213 
Fourth, fiduciary representation obligates agencies to exercise their 
rulemaking powers in a manner that is consistent with the principles of 
fairness. Under the fiduciary duty of loyalty, all private parties whose legal 
or practical interests are dependent upon and vulnerable to federal 
207. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) ("[T]he exercise of quasi-
legislative authority by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such 
power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes."); Stark v. Wickard, 321 
U.S. 288, 309 (1944) ("When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry 
on governmental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted."). 
208. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,472 (2001). 
209. See Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 302 (noting that quasi-legislative authority is subject to the 
limitations that Congress imposes). 
210. See id. at 306-08 (holding that in order for a regulation to have the force oflaw, it must be 
reasonably contemplated by the statutory grant of authority). 
211. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006) (holding that the Controlled 
Substances Act does not authorize the Attorney General to regulate physician-assisted suicide). 
212. Cf GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES § 543, at 217 (2d ed. rev. 1993) (describing a trustee's duty of loyalty as complete 
loyalty to beneficiaries' interests and ignorance of any selfish interests). 
213. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 92 (2007) (describing the initial duty of a trustee 
to review and revise investments within a "reasonable time"); id. at cmt. b ("[A] trustee may be held 
liable for losses resulted from imprudently retaining trust property or from unreasonably delaying 
its sale."). 
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rulemaking powers are co-equal beneficiaries of state legal authority. As 
such, federal regulators may not disregard the interests of any person whose 
interests may be affected by a proposed rulemaking action, and their final 
rule must treat similarly situated persons alike. Fiduciaries must accord "due 
regard" to each and every beneficiary's respective interests. 214 
Fifth, federal regulators as fiduciaries must accord their beneficiaries 
due respect by exercising their rulemaking powers reasonably. As in private 
fiduciary law, federal regulators must employ "proper safeguards and 
internal procedures" and consider "the advice of specialists or experts where 
necessary to make informed decisions."215 Fiduciary representation requires 
a thorough investigation of regulatory problems, obligating regulators to 
gather relevant information, consider advice and criticism from interested 
parties, solicit input from experts, and rationally assess the merits of alterna-
tive policies. Once regulators settle upon a proposed course of action, they 
must provide a reasoned justification for their chosen policy. In short, the 
fiduciary model dictates that federal regulation must bear the same hallmarks 
of deliberative rationality that characterize fiduciary representation in ordi-
nary private law settings. 
Sixth, the fiduciary model of popular representation requires federal 
regulators to act transparently, opening records and communications to 
public inspection upon request in order to facilitate effective monitoring of 
the principles of purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, and 
reasonableness. It is conceivable, of course, that federal regulators could 
satisfy their primary fiduciary obligations of purposefulness, integrity, 
solicitude, fairness, and reasonableness without transparency. In the absence 
of transparency, however, the beneficiaries of federal regulation would be 
unable to discover many breaches of duty, rendering the other principles of 
fiduciary representation ineffectual and thereby subjecting beneficiaries to 
intolerable vulnerability. Transparency is ordinarily necessary, therefore, to 
ensure that administrative agencies perform their fiduciary role faithfully. 
Where agencies seek to deviate from the transparency norm, they must fur-
nish reasoned justifications that are consistent with their other fiduciary 
obligations of purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, and 
reasonableness. 
Few if any of these six principles of fiduciary representation would play 
a central role in the majoritarian proxy model of popular representation. As 
long as a federal regulation enjoyed the support of a public majority, it would 
make little difference under the proxy model whether the regulation com-
ported with Congress's purposes, whether it arbitrarily discriminated against 
rival classes of beneficiaries, or whether it reflected rational deliberation 
conducive to informed decision making. In contrast, the fiduciary model 
214. /d.§79. 
215. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 212, § 541, at 171. 
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insists that each of these principles is critical to achieve meaningful popular 
representation in the modem administrative state. These six principles of 
public fiduciary obligation are relational constraints that the rule of law 
places on public officials' exercise of administrative powers.Z16 
D. Fiduciary Representation in Agency Rulemaking: Three Applications 
To what extent does federal administrative law currently promote 
fiduciary representation in agency rulemaking? The results are mixed, to be 
sure. The APA's notice-and-comment procedures for informal rulemaking 
arguably advance fiduciary representation by encouraging federal agencies to 
act fairly, reasonably, and transparently.217 So, too, do the APA's require-
ments for formal rulemaking, which permit agencies to promulgate 
regulations only at the close of a trial-type evidentiary hearing.218 The 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIAi 19 and Federal Advisory Committee Act 
(F ACAi20 likewise promote transparency by facilitating public access to a 
range of documents and communications relevant to agency rulemaking. 221 
These procedural requirements are steps in the right direction, though they 
are hardly sufficient to realize fiduciary representation in federal rulemaking. 
While an exhaustive discussion of the fiduciary model's implications 
for federal rulemaking lies beyond the scope of this Article, a few examples 
of the fiduciary model's potential applications to administrative rulemaking 
may help to illustrate the model's practical value. Specifically, Congress 
could harmonize the AP A's general rulemaking procedures with the fidu-
ciary model of the administrative state by: (1) recalibrating the APA's 
exceptions for informal notice-and-comment rulemaking, (2) expanding judi-
cial review of agency inaction in rulemaking, and (3) mandating disclosure 
of communications between agencies and the White House related to agency 
rulemaking. 222 
216. See Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 271-72 (characterizing the "fiduciary duty" of the 
government as simultaneously justifying and defining the boundaries of governmental action). 
217. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2006) (specifying, respectively, requirements for notice to and 
participation of interested parties in proposed rules). 
218. !d. §§ 556-557. 
219. !d.§ 552. 
220. !d. app. §§ 1-16. 
221. See id. § 552(a)(2) (mandating agency publication of decisions made in adjudication, 
certain "statements of policy and interpretations," and "manuals and instructions to staff that affect 
a member of the public"); id. app. §§ 10--11 (requiring advisory committee meetings be open to the 
public and that certain written records, including transcripts, of such meetings be made available to 
the public). 
222. Versions of these proposals have been articulated elsewhere in the literature on federal 
rulemaking, and it is not my purpose to elaborate the policy arguments for and against these 
proposals with all of the nuance and sophistication that others have devoted to them. Instead, my 
aim is simply to illustrate how the fiduciary model illuminates a new path toward popular 
representation in agency rulemaking. 
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1. Eliminate the APA 's Categorical Exemptions for Informal 
Rulemaking.-An important first step in reforming federal rulemaking 
procedure would be to extend the fiduciary model's general principles of de-
liberative decision making to all forms of agency rulemaking. 
Currently, the APA divides agency rulemaking into three broad 
categories: substantive rules (or "legislative rules"), interpretive rules, and 
procedural rules.223 Substantive rules generate legal obligations, altering 
people's existing rights and obligations pursuant to statutory authority.224 
Procedural rules also command the force of law, prescribing the procedures 
an agency will employ in carrying out its administrative functions.225 
Interpretive rules, which "express an agency's intended course of action or 
its view of the meaning of a statute or regulation," are not formally 
binding.226 The classification of a particular rule as substantive, interpretive, 
or procedural has important consequences: while the AP A requires agencies 
to publish all three types of rules,227 only the first category-legislative 
rules-are subject to the APA's full notice-and-comment procedural 
requirements. 228 
The problem with exempting interpretive and procedural rules from the 
AP A notice-and-comment procedures is that both categories can have a 
significant impact on private interests and obligations. Interpretive rules, for 
example, may profoundly influence agency enforcement practices and judi-
cial statutory interpretation.229 Similarly, procedural rules may restrict the 
opportunities for regulated parties or beneficiaries to defend their interests in 
agency adjudicatory proceedings.230 No matter what type of rules an agency 
adopts, the fiduciary model dictates that the agency should be prepared to 
223. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(l) (differentiating publication deadlines for substantive and 
interpretive rules); Clary v. United States, 85 F.3d 1041, 1048 (2d Cir. 1996) (recognizing an APA 
distinction between "legislative" and interpretive rules). 
224. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, § 4.8, at 181. 
225. !d. at 180. 
226. !d. at 181. 
227. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). 
228. !d. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
229. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001) (holding that customs-
revenue letters, while not having the force oflaw, "may merit some deference whatever its form"); 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (affirming the Court's historic recognition of 
Treasury interpretative decisions as having "considerable and in some cases decisive weight"); 
Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. 
REv. 397, 40{}-{)1 (2007) (noting that agency-guidance documents are often treated as having the 
force of law by parties subject to the regulation, since to behave otherwise would require parties to 
accept the expense and risks of challenging the interpretation in court). 
230. See 2 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE§ 5.13 (2d ed. 1997) 
(discussing administrative agencies' wide discretion in structuring hearings including, in some 
cases, the authority to issue rules dispensing with formal adjudication of any kind). 
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explain how its rules are fair, reasonable, purposive, and public regarding.231 
In its current form, the AP A does not satisfy these basic principles. 
Equally disconcerting, the APA does not even require deliberative 
decision making for many categories of legislative rules. The AP A expressly 
excludes from its coverage any legislative rules that address military or for-
eign affairs functions,232 rules governing agency management or personnel,233 
and rules related to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts."234 
These exceptions to the APA's ordinary rulemaking categories have been 
widely criticized as overinclusive235 -relics of an earlier era's misguided 
commitment to the rights/privileges distinction236-yet Congress has not 
fully implemented recommendations for refonn.237 Agencies are always free 
to employ more robust deliberative procedures than those required under the 
APA,238 but in practice they do not always engage in open public deliberation 
over rules that fall within these categories. 239 As a result, the AP A does not 
ensure that agencies satisfy their fiduciary obligations in these contexts. 
Agencies may decline to employ notice-and-comment procedures even when 
these procedures are self-evidently necessary, practicable, and in the public 
interest.240 These loopholes in agency notice-and-comment rulemaking 
should be closed to promote purposeful, reasonable, and transparent 
rulemaking. 
231. Jessica Mantel has employed a similar "trustee" theory to advocate enhanced procedural 
requirements for agency guidance statements. See Mantel, supra note 56, at 364-65 (arguing that 
administrative procedures should "promote adherence" to the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and 
obedience to the law). 
232. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(l). 
233. ld. § 553(a)(2). 
234. ld. 
235. See Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the APA Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R. 
§ 305.69-8 ( 1974) (detailing § 553(a)(2) rules pertaining to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, 
or contracts"); Elimination of the "Military or Foreign Affairs Function" Exemption from AP A 
Rulemaking Requirements, I C.F.R. § 305.73-5 (1975) (detailing§ 553(a)(l)). The Administrative 
Conference of the United States (ACUS) adopted recommendations, which were published in the 
Federal Register, then compiled in § 305 of the C.F.R. The ACUS was terminated in 1996, and 
§ 305 was accordingly removed from the C.F.R. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, Military and Foreign 
Affairs Function Rulemaking Under the APA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 221,238 (1972) (arguing that while 
a narrow construction would be preferable, the language of the "military or foreign affairs function" 
exemption is nevertheless "very broad"). 
236. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, § 4.12, at 197 (contending that there is no justification to 
maintain the exclusions). 
237. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 48-49 (3d ed. 
1998) (discussing Congress's piecemeal efforts to broaden notice-and-comment procedures for 
particular agencies). 
238. See The Procedural and Practice Rule Exemption from the APA Notice-and-Comment 
Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-1 (1993) (recommending that agencies voluntarily 
use notice-and-comment procedures for most procedural rules). 
239. Bonfield, supra note 235, at 232. 
240. See LUBBERS, supra note 237, at 46-47 (discussing the § 553 exemptions and noting that, 
because they involve important governmental functions, they have been strongly criticized). 
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To be sure, the fiduciary model does not necessarily require notice-and-
comment procedures for all rulemaking initiatives. To borrow Justice 
Robert H. Jackson's colorful expression, fiduciary representation is not a 
"suicide pact,"241 nor need it be a prescription for paralysis by analysis. 
Federal agencies might reasonably dispense with notice-and-comment 
procedures where the cost, inconvenience, or delay attending such proce-
dures would be "unnecessary" or "impracticable."242 On the other hand, the 
fiduciary model cannot approve agencies adopting regulations that would 
materially impact the public interest without satisfying the fundamental prin-
ciples of fairness, reasonableness, and solicitude. Whatever form agency 
rulemaking might take, agencies must employ a robust deliberative process 
supported by rational reason giving. 
2. Expand Judicial Review of Agency Inaction-Second, Congress 
should expand judicial review of agency inaction to ensure agencies' fidelity 
to congressional purposes. For many critics, the most frustrating character-
istic of presidential administration is its perceived tendency to enervate 
agency rulemaking.243 Rather than spurring agencies to action, White House 
officials have been accused of exploiting their political influence behind the 
scenes to delay or block disfavored rulemaking initiatives?44 Such criticisms 
dogged the Bush Administration, for instance, in fields such as environ-
mental protection and occupational health and safety.245 
Whether agency inaction and delay should be viewed as cause for alarm 
will depend, of course, upon whether one accepts the proxy model or the fi-
duciary model of popular representation. Under the proxy model, the White 
House's decision to stay an agency rulemaking proposal could be perceived 
as a pro-majoritarian check on countermajoritarian bureaucratic decision 
making.246 Conversely, under the fiduciary model, agency delay and inaction 
241. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
242. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2006). Indeed, the fiduciary model arguably militates against 
notice-and-comment rulemaking where the resources required would be so grossly disproportionate 
to the particular issue presented as to be "contrary to the public interest." !d. Under the fiduciary 
model, however, an agency's determination that there is "good cause" to depart from notice-and-
comment procedures would itself be subject to judicial review. See LUBBERS, supra note 237, at 76 
& n.l74 (suggesting that courts may apply even heavier scrutiny to such departures). 
243. See, e.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 118, at 1274 ("Agencies' decisions not to regulate 
can be every bit as costly to society as overly expensive regulations .... "). 
244. See, e.g., Amy Goldstein & Sarah Cohen, Bush Forces a Shift in Regulatory Thntst: OSHA 
Made More Business-Friendly, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2004, at AI ("Unlike his two predecessors, 
Bush has canceled more of the unfinished regulatory work he inherited than he has 
completed .... "); ROBERT SHULL ET AL., OMB WATCH, THE BUSH REGULATORY RECORD: A 
PATTERN OF FAILURE 4 (2004), http://www.ombwatch.org/files/regs/2004/pattemoffailure/ 
finalreport.pdf (reviewing rulemaking initiatives withdrawn by EPA, FDA, NHTSA, and OSHA 
during the first term of George W. Bush's Administration). 
245. SHULL ET AL., supra note 244, at 25-32,51-57. 
246. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness 
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1676--77 (2004) (noting that the "presidential control model" 
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unaccompanied by a reasoned justification would pose precisely the same 
risks of unfairness, unreasonableness, opportunism, and waste that arise in 
proactive agency action, and both types of arbitrary agency decision making 
violate agencies' basic fiduciary duties. 
The AP A already specifies that agencies must "conclude a matter 
presented to" them "within a reasonable time,"247 and it authorizes courts to 
"compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. "248 In 
practice, however, federal courts have been reluctant to set aside the 
President's assessment of the "reasonableness" of agency inaction or the 
"reasonable" timeline for rulemaking in favor of their own independent 
assessment. 249 Some courts have held that agency decisions to withhold or 
delay rulemaking action are simply unreviewable.250 Others have agreed to 
consider claims based on agency inaction but have deferred all too quickly to 
agencies' reasonableness assessments. 251 
While some judicial deference to agency agenda setting and resource 
allocation might be appropriate, the fiduciary model supports more robust 
judicial review of agency inaction in the rulemaking context-whether it be 
an agency's failure to initiate rulemaking, delay of ongoing rulemaking 
proceedings, or the unreasonable termination of rulemaking without issuance 
of a rule. The best way to make agency fiduciary duties credible in these 
contexts would be to strengthen judicial review by loosening ( l) the doctrine 
of nonreviewability, which limits the types of claims that may be raised 
against agency inaction, and (2) the doctrine of standing, which limits the 
types of parties who may bring claims based on agency inaction.252 Professor 
seeks to "reconcile agency decisionrnaking with the ultimate form of majority rule ... by relocating 
agencies from the headless fourth branch to the executive branch"); Nzelibe, supra note 23, at 1265 
(restating the argument "that presidential input in agency decisionrnaking constitutes a good proxy 
for majoritarianism because the president is in some sense accountable to the people"). 
247. 5 u.s.c. § 555(b). 
248. 5 u.s.c. § 706(1). 
249. Bressman, supra note 246, at 168(}-82. 
250. See, e.g., Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's refusal to take steps to protect a nuclear plant from terrorist 
attack was unreviewable); Nat') Cong. of Hispanic Am. Citizens v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 882, 891 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (declining to review OSHA's refusal to issue field sanitation standards). 
251. See, e.g., In re Mine Workers of Am. Int'l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 553-56 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(declining to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the Mine Safety and Health Administration to 
comply with statutory timelines for rulemaking); Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 797 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) ("[W]e are properly hesitant to upset an agency's priorities by ordering it to expedite one 
specific action, and thus to give it precedence over others."); Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 
F.2d I, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("An agency's refusal to institute a rulemaking proceeding is at the 
high end of the [deference] range."). But see In re lnt ' l Chern. Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144, 
1149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (determining that OSHA's six-year delay in issuing health standards on 
workers' exposure to cadmium was unreasonable and imposing a deadline for completion). 
252. See Bressman, supra note 246, at 1665 (arguing that the doctrines prevent parties from 
challenging agency inaction). See generally Criddle, supra note 35, at 172-78 (comparing standing 
doctrine in administrative law and private fiduciary law and arguing for broader private-citizen 
standing in administrative law). 
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Bressman has argued persuasively that these doctrines "relieve agencies of 
the obligation to engage in reason-giving and standard-setting" by 
"immuniz[ing] agency inaction from judicial review."253 In the absence of 
judicial review, it becomes "more likely that agencies will respond to private 
or political pressure rather than public welfare by giving those typically 
harmed by agency action (i.e., regulated entities) more power to protest than 
those typically harmed by agency inaction (i.e., regulatory beneficiaries)."254 
The solution to these factionalist pressures, she asserts, is to impose a re-
quirement of deliberative reason giving for agency inaction comparable to 
the reason-giving requirements for agency action.255 Protracted delays in 
rulemaking proceedings should be accompanied by a "reasoned explanation" 
of the grounds and purpose for delaying promulgation of an anticipated rule, 
and this statement should be subject to some form of judicial review, 
however deferential.256 As Bressman observes, "enforcing the requirements 
of reason-giving and standard-setting ... will promote the conditions that 
prevent, or at least minimize, corrupting influences from pervading 
administrative ... decision-making."257 The fiduciary model thus favors 
promoting deliberative rationality in agency rulemaking through mandatory 
reason-giving requirements backed by judicial review. 
Fiduciary administration does not necessarily require more extensive 
federal regulation. What is essential, as the Supreme Court recognized in 
Massachusetts v. EPA,258 is for agencies to provide rational justifications for 
inaction that are consistent with their statutory mandates and the factual rec-
ord before the agency.259 At present, the absence of statutory reason-giving 
requirements for agency inaction, coupled with the federal judiciary's 
traditionally begrudging nonreviewability and standing doctrines, allows 
federal agencies to deny rulemaking requests without providing any rational 
justification whatsoever.260 Such arbitrary behavior is inconsistent with the 
fiduciary character of public administrative power. 
3. Include White House Communications in the Administrative 
Record.-To ensure that White House policy guidance enhances fiduciary 
administration, Congress should require agencies to disclose communications 
253. Bressman, supra note 246, at 1691. 
254. !d. at 1692; see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 
157, 157-59 (1996) (presenting a similar proposal for judicial review of agency inaction). 
255. The APA requires agencies to "incorporate in the rules adopted a concise statement of 
their basis and purpose." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). 
256. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007); see also id. at 527-28 ("Refusals to 
promulgate rules are ... susceptible to judicial review, though such review is 'extremely limited' 
and 'highly deferential."' (quoting Nat'! Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. 
United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989))). 
257 . Bressman, supra note 246, at 1693. 
258. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
259. !d. at 534. 
260. Bressman, supra note 246, at 1665. 
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between the White House and agency personnel regarding pending 
rulemaking proceedings.261 Currently, the APA forbids ex parte 
communications only in formal rulemaking proceedings, turning a blind eye 
to ex parte communications arising in ordinary notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.262 President Clinton's Executive Order No. 12,866 mandates 
some public disclosure of documents exchanged between agencies and 
OIRA, but it does not address communications between agencies and other 
White House offices.263 Justice Scalia and various other commentators have 
defended the exclusion of White House communications from the public rec-
ord in whole or in part, arguing that this approach facilitates candid dialogue 
on important policy questions.264 
Fiduciary administration, in contrast, favors mandatory disclosure for 
nearly all White House communications with agencies related to pending 
rulemaking actions-irrespective of whether the communications convey 
factual information or policy advice. While a rulemaking proposal is 
pending, all ex parte contacts related to the proposal-including 
communications with the White House-should be prohibited.265 If the 
President, his staff, or other federal agencies wish to offer guidance on a 
pending rulemaking proposal, Congress should require that they do so on the 
record during the agency's public comment period.266 These reforms would 
channel the White House's policy guidance into the public sphere where it 
could bolster, rather than undermine, fiduciary administration. 
261. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decision Making, 
36 AM. U. L. REv. 443, 451-62 (1987) (criticizing the President's role in agency regulation, 
especially with undisclosed interventions). 
262. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(a), 557(d)(l) (2006). 
263. Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 6(a)(3)(E), (b)(4), 3 C.F.R. 638, 646-47 (1994), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 (1994). 
264. See, e.g., Intragovernmental Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, I 
C.F.R. § 305.80-6 (1981) (recommending a distinction between factual information and policy 
advice, and arguing for disclosure only of the former); see also, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Two Wrongs 
Make a Right: The Judicialization ofStandardless Rulemaking, REG., July-Aug. 1977, 38, at 40--41 
(discussing the benefits of frank and informal conversation off the record in the rulemaking 
process). 
265. See I PIERCE, supra note 13, § 7.9, at 356 (arguing that Congress could forbid agencies 
from engaging in ex parte contacts with the White House during rulemaking). Exceptions might be 
warranted for communications in highly sensitive fields such as national security, but in such cases 
the fiduciary model would support a requirement that agencies furnish a reasonable justification for 
withholding disclosure. 
266. See Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking, I C.F.R. § 305.88-9 (1991) 
(recommending disclosure of conduit communications); LUBBERS, supra note 237, at 27 n.l30 
(discussing the ABA's endorsement of "Recommendation 88-9 in its entirety"); NAT'L ACAD. OF 
PUB. ADMIN., PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING IN REGULATORY AGENCIES 35 
( 1987) (arguing that maintenance of a written record will provide precedent and reduce the need for 
judicial review); McGarity, supra note 261, at 462 (acknowledging that the President has a 
legitimate role in establishing policy but stressing that presidential participation, nonetheless, should 
be open to public scrutiny). 
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At the close of agency rulemaking proceedings, White House 
communications should be included in the administrative record for judicial 
review. Requiring full disclosure and judicial review of communications 
between White House officials and agency officials would serve several 
salutary purposes. First, this approach would render the White House's 
influence over agency rulemaking more accessible to public scrutiny, 
reinforcing the President's electoral accountability. Second, setting aside its 
proverbial disinfectant properties, transparency would promote greater policy 
coordination among the White House's internal offices, ameliorating the in-
ternal conflicts reported by Professors Bressman and Vandenbergh.267 The 
disclosure of White House communications would also enable federal courts 
to reinforce agency fiduciary representation more effectively through judicial 
review of agency rulemaking?68 If agencies were to rely on White House 
information or policy guidance, courts conducting hard look review could 
consider these communications alongside other material in the administrative 
record such as the agency's own expert reports and comments from private 
parties. Where agencies unreasonably disregard warnings about potential 
interagency policy conflicts, courts might strike down agency regulations as 
"arbitrary" and "capricious" under the AP A. 269 Conversely, federal regula-
tions might be considered arbitrary and capricious where agencies rely on 
White House directives unreasonably to the neglect of important scientific 
facts or expert judgments. In short, we might reasonably expect greater 
White House transparency to enhance agency deliberation while reducing the 
risk of arbitrary political jawboning and interest-group capture. 
Executive privilege does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the 
disclosure of White House communications with agency officials. In 
Humphrey's Executor v. United States,270 the Supreme Court declared that 
"[t]he authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial 
agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of 
executive control cannot well be doubted."271 Relying on this basic principle, 
lower courts have preserved the APA's prohibition on ex parte communica-
tions against constitutional challenge in the context of White House 
intervention into formal agency adjudication. 272 Under the reasoning of 
267. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 121, at 49 (discussing internal conflicts 
resulting from the influence of multiple offices in the rulemaking process). 
268. See McGarity, supra note 261, at 461--{)2 (arguing that judicial review becomes "an 
elaborate and expensive charade" if agencies can base their decisions on "secret communications 
with the President or his staft"). 
269. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); see also Strauss, supra note 62, at 736 (noting anecdotally 
that agency administrators would occasionally "tell the President to pound sand" when "the 
President knew they had the political capital to win"). 
270. 295 u.s. 602 (1935). 
271. !d. at 629. 
272. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1546 
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding the APA's ex parte communication prohibition applicable to the 
Endangered Species Committee, the President, and the White House staft). 
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Humphrey's Executor and its progeny, there would seem to be no compelling 
reason why Congress could not also proscribe ex parte communications 
between the White House and agency administrators in informal rulemaking. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals endorsed this implication of 
Humphrey's Executor in Portland Audubon Society v. Endangered Species 
Committee. 273 Taking up the banner of presidential administration, the first 
Bush Administration argued that the APA's restriction on ex parte communi-
cations unconstitutionally undermined the President's authority to instruct 
and guide inferior executive officers.274 The Ninth Circuit "reject[ed] this 
argument out of hand," however, emphasizing the "fundamental precept of 
administrative law that when an agency performs a quasi-judicial (or quasi-
legislative) function its independence must be protected."275 The court 
recognized that although executive privilege might protect certain internal 
White House communications from public disclosure, it did not preclude 
Congress from proscribing ex parte White House communications with 
agency officials in the course of informal rulemaking proceedings. 276 
Those who view the President as an effective proxy for popular 
preferences will likely contest my argument that White House policy 
guidance merits hard look judicial review. If presidents are better suited than 
federal judges to determine whether federal regulations comport with ma-
joritarian preferences, a plausible argument could be made that federal law 
should not authorize judges to second-guess presidential policy guidance. 
On the other hand, if (as I have argued) majoritarian preferences are largely 
illusory in the administrative state and White House regulatory review re-
mains an unreliable proxy, hard look judicial review might well be the best 
available vehicle for promoting fiduciary representation in agency 
rulemaking. 277 
E. Fiduciary Representation and Popular Sovereignty 
As these examples illustrate, the fiduciary model of state legal authority 
furnishes a credible framework for honoring popular sovereignty and 
promoting popular representation in the modern administrative state. The 
fiduciary model responds to Bickel's basic concern about the need for 
273. 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993). But see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,408 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (holding that in the absence of further congressional action, neither the Clean Air Act nor due 
process require disclosure of all presidential communications with agencies during informal 
rulemaking). 
274. Portland Audubon Soc'y, 984 F.2d at 1546. 
275. !d. 
276. See id. (analyzing whether Congress proscribing ex parte White House communications 
with agency officials interfered with a presidential prerogative). 
277. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-
Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. I, 24 (1994) ("Judicial review may encourage deliberative decision-
making aimed at the public interest by delineating statutory goals in terms of some public-regarding 
purposes."). 
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popular representation in federal lawmaking, but it also confronts and 
addresses the obvious blind spots in his conception of popular representation. 
If the public lacks discrete preferences on questions of regulatory policy, and 
if broader public preferences (to the extent they exist) are malleable and dic-
tated in large part by the public's dynamic interaction with state institutions, 
then the majoritarian argument for presidential administration loses much of 
its force. 278 Shedding Bickel's dubious preoccupation with majoritarianism, 
the fiduciary model acknowledges the inevitability and indispensability of 
administrative discretion in a republican democrac/79 and instead empha-
sizes institutional fidelity, as measured against the principles of 
purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonableness, and 
transparency. These principles of fiduciary representation circumscribe the 
outer limits of administrative discretion in agency rulemaking, underscoring 
the fiduciary responsibilities that the public entrusts to their elected and ap-
pointed representatives throughout the administrative state. 
Fiduciary representation bears certain affinities to civic-republican and 
deliberative-democracy theories of the administrative state insofar as its 
principles of integrity, solicitude, fairness, and reasonableness invite public 
officials to engage in reflective deliberation on the common good.280 Each of 
these theories emphasizes substantive values and processes that should in-
form state decision making, including whether regulators honor 
congressional purpose, engage diverse perspectives, and provide rational 
justifications for their decisions. 281 Fiduciary representation is distinguish-
able from some strains of deliberative-democracy theory, however, because it 
does not treat the public's engagement in agency deliberation as an end in 
itself, nor does it rely upon the deliberative process to produce a legitimating 
social consensus.282 Instead, fiduciary representation views agency 
278. See Somin, supra note 101, at 1292 (suggesting that legislative output does not represent 
majoritarian will if the electorate is ill-informed about politics and government policy). 
279. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("Congress simply cannot do its 
job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives."). 
280. See PITKIN, supra note 141, at 163-65 (arguing that representatives should do what is in 
their constituents' best interests and must explain and reconsider their views when they differ from 
the constituents' wishes); id. at 193 (noting that Madison believed the purpose of a well-ordered 
government was to promote deliberation over the common good); Mantel, supra note 56, at 369 
(reviewing applications of civic-republican theory to administrative governance); Mark Seidenfeld, 
A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1528 (1992) 
(linking this deliberative process of agency decision making to the civic-republican tradition, which 
emphasizes "the public good" rather than "majority rule"); Staszewski, supra note 101, at 1278-94 
(developing a deliberative-democracy theory of governmental accountability). 
281. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 3-4 
(2004) (arguing that the most fundamental purpose of deliberative democracy is to require 
representatives and citizens to justify their decisions); Seidenfeld, supra note 280, at 1531-32 
("[T]o be legitimate, a decision must respect the positions of all interest groups and respond to their 
arguments in terms of the good of the community."). 
282. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 281, at 21-23 (debating whether deliberative 
democracy is useful just as a means of arriving at good policies or whether it also manifests mutual 
respect between citizens and representatives); Seidenfeld, supra note 280, at 1534 (noting that civic 
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deliberation and transparency as principles that are necessary (albeit not 
sufficient) to ensure that discretionary agency lawmaking promotes the pub-
lic welfare. The fiduciary model recognizes that public engagement in 
agency deliberation may help to clarify the stakes of regulation, but public 
disengagement and disharmony do not necessarily eviscerate the legitimacy 
of administrative action.283 Under the fiduciary model, the process-oriented 
values of administrative governance are simply "a means to enforce the trust 
placed in representatives," not a panacea for political discord or regulatory 
malaise.284 
To some, the fiduciary model might appear uncomfortably close to 
Burke's much-maligned theory that all government institutions serve as 
"trustees for the people."285 Burke invoked the fiduciary concept as support 
for the argument that public authority ought to reside in a "natural 
aristocracy"-namely, men of superior skills and ability who would be best 
equipped to discern the national interest through reasoned deliberation.286 
This vision of the trusteeship state has been criticized as lending a false 
veneer of political legitimacy to aristocratic oligarchy and colonial 
imperialism.287 "Burke could regard all government as a trusteeship," writes 
one critic, because under his theory of representation "no democratic 
implication need be involved, nor are elections necessary."288 
While it is true that Burke's trusteeship model and the fiduciary model 
of the state spring from a common intellectual tradition, the facial similarities 
between the two conceptions of popular representation run mostly skin deep. 
Unlike Burkean trusteeship, the fiduciary model of state legal authority is 
grounded in popular sovereignty and honors the public's prerogative to shape 
government institutions, participate in government policy formation, require 
government officials to provide fair, reasonable, and other-regarding 
justifications for their actions, and seek the removal of incompetent or 
republicanism "insist[s) that government actions reflect social consensus about the common good"); 
cf ELY, supra note 2, at 87 (arguing that judicial review should be "participation-oriented"). But 
see Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Extremism and Social Learning, I J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
263, 263-64 (2009) (arguing that deliberation may exacerbate group polarization rather than 
generate consensus). 
283. Were this not so, virtually no state action could be considered legitimate. 
284. Brown, supra note 3, at 565. 
285. See BURKE, supra note 137, at 28 ("The king is the representative of the people; so are the 
lords; so are the judges. They all are trustees for the people .... "). 
286. EDMUND BURKE, The French Revolution, in BURKE'S POLITICS, supra note 137, at 277, 
397-98. 
287. See, e.g., David Bromwich, Introduction to EDMUND BURKE, ON EMPIRE, LIBERTY, AND 
REFORM : SPEECHES AND LETTERS I, 35 (David Bromwich ed., 2000) (contending that Burke 
believed there should be a ruling elite composed of a natural aristocracy); GUTMANN & THOMPSON, 
supra note 281, at 8 (criticizing Burke's trustee theory as "more aristocratic than democratic"); 
JAMES HOGAN, ELECTION AND REPRESENTATION 157 (1945) (describing Burke as "the last and 
greatest champion of parliamentary oligarchy ... protesting against the notion of a democratic 
franchise"). 
288. PITKlN, supra note 141, at 129. 
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unprincipled government officers. 289 The fiduciary model also provides 
discrete criteria for evaluating the performance of public officials in their 
roles as representatives.290 Moreover, the fiduciary model does not authorize 
public officials to disregard the general will of the people entirely. Because 
individual dignity entails freedom to define one's own ends, public prefer-
ences are always a relevant and important factor when public officials 
consider how best to promote the public welfare, and such preferences merit 
serious consideration within the deliberative processes of public 
lawmaking.291 Whatever path regulators choose, they must be prepared to 
furnish a reasonable explanation for their decision that responds to opposing 
viewpoints. 292 Thus, far from undermining democratic governance, the fidu-
ciary conception of popular representation should facilitate transparency, 
rationality, consensus building, and political accountability.293 
Others might argue that the concept of fiduciary obligation in 
administrative law is incoherent because concepts such as the public welfare 
and the common good are subject to a range of interpretations and may be 
radically indeterminate at the margins. Even if all could agree that adminis-
trative agencies bear a fiduciary obligation to promote the public welfare, 
this notional consensus might be of little value if the public welfare itself re-
mains a fundamentally contested concept. To be sure, Congress has a role to 
play in defining the public welfare by providing intelligible principles to 
guide agency lawmaking. But these principles are often pitched at such a 
high level of generality that agencies are left with broad discretion to clarify 
both the nature of the task at hand and the best tools for accomplishing the 
task.294 As a result, administrative agencies often enjoy sweeping policy-
289. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 36, at 351-52 (comparing Burke's theory of 
colonial trusteeship, which denies the ability of colonized peoples to govern themselves, with the 
postcolonial fiduciary theory, which emphasizes popular sovereignty). 
290. /d. 
291. See PITKIN, supra note 141, at 161 ("Surely sometimes we can promote a person's welfare 
even against his wishes; yet we would not want to say in general that people's wishes are irrelevant 
to a definition of their welfare."); cf Representative Edmund Burke, British Parliament, Speech at 
the Conclusion of the Poll (Nov. 3, 1774), in 2 THE WORKS OF THE RlGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND 
BURKE 9, 15 (Henry G. Bohn ed., 1854) ("Your representative owes you ... his judgment; and he 
betrays, instead of serving you, ifhe sacrifices it to your opinion."). 
292. See PITKIN, supra note 141, at 163-64 ("(W)hen a representative finds himself in conflict 
with his constituents' wishes, this fact must give him pause. It calls for a consideration of the 
reasons for the discrepancy . . . . Acting contrary to their wishes is not necessarily wrong, not 
necessarily bad representation or in violation of a representative's duty. It may, indeed, be required 
of him in certain situations. But it is abnormal in the sense that it calls for explanation or 
justification."); see also Mashaw, supra note 168, at 118 ("Reason giving . .. treats persons as 
rational moral agents who are entitled to evaluate and participate in a dialogue about official 
policies on the basis of reasoned discussion. It affmns the individual as subject rather than object of 
the law . . .. Authority without reason is literally dehumanizing."). 
293 . Staszewski, supra note 101, at 1279-84 (discussing these four virtues of reason giving). 
294. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472, 475 (2001) (observing that 
although "Congress must 'lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle'" for agencies to 
follow, the Supreme Court has "never demanded . .. that statutes provide a 'determinate criterion'" 
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making discretion as they arbitrate between competing public preferences or 
conceptions of the common good.295 
To be clear, fiduciary representation does not aspire to furnish a 
comprehensive theory of the public welfare, nor does its force depend upon 
any such theory. The fiduciary model simply recognizes the brute fact that 
the law necessarily entrusts policy-making discretion to administrative 
agencies, and it seeks to constrain particular exercises of administrative 
discretion within acceptable bounds. After satisfying the basic principles of 
fiduciary administration, regulators may find that they still enjoy substantial 
discretion to determine what policy alternative will best advance Congress's 
general purposes and promote the broader public welfare. Whether particular 
delegations of lawmaking authority to administrative agencies are appropri-
ate remains a political question for Congress to work out in deliberation with 
the public, subject only to constitutional constraints. To the extent that 
Congress chooses to entrust discretionary lawmaking authority to 
administrative agencies, however, the fiduciary model suggests that such acts 
of entrustment are not necessarily inconsistent with popular sovereignty, 
provided that agencies respect the fiduciary character of their entrusted 
authority. 
V. Fiduciary Administration 
Viewed from the fiduciary model's perspective, the administrative state 
comes into focus as an intricate network of nested fiduciary relations. 
Presidents, legislators, judges, administrators, and other public officials serve 
as fiduciary representatives for their beneficiaries, the people subject to their 
entrusted administrative powers. 
Keeping this broad view of the fiduciary character of state legal 
authority in mind, this Part returns to the problem presented in Part 11-the 
rise of presidential control over agency rulemaking-and considers what, if 
anything, the fiduciary conception of popular representation might tell us 
about the President's representative role in federal administrative lawmaking. 
While the conclusions presented in this discussion are necessarily provisional 
and highlight the need for further empirical investigation, the fiduciary model 
at the very least calls into question the desirability of presidential administra-
tion as a strategy for promoting popular representation in agency rulemaking. 
Rather than staying the current course toward full-fledged presidential 
administration, I argue that the White House could promote popular 
representation more effectively by observing certain "passive virtues" of 
prudential abstention and deference in its interaction with agency regulators. 
to constrain agency discretion (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 
409 ( 1928))). 
295. See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE IMPORTANCE 
OF GROUPS IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 48 ( 1998) (describing the "pluralistic assumption 
that the best political outcomes would arise as a result of group conflict"). 
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A. Presidents and Administrators as Fiduciary Representatives 
On first impression, there would seem to be little reason for the 
fiduciary model to prefer either presidents or agency administrators as the 
final decision makers in administrative lawmaking. Both presidents and 
agency administrators occupy positions of public trust, and both are capable 
of honoring the fiduciary principles of purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, 
fairness, reasonableness, and transparency. Upon closer inspection, however, 
several key factors suggest that presidential administration is less likely to 
advance fiduciary representation than traditional agency administration. 
Consider first the question of legal entrustment, the starting point for all 
fiduciary representation. Some advocates of presidential administration have 
advocated presidential administration on constitutional grounds, arguing that 
the Vesting and Faithful Execution Clauses of Article II establish a "unitary" 
Executive Branch under the President's undivided managerial contro1.296 
Others have suggested that the President's authority to direct agency 
rulemaking initiatives may be inferred from more general constitutional 
themes such as popular accountability or aversion to factionalism, 297 or from 
implicit statutory delegations to the President.298 However, the weight of 
authority runs against these unitary-executive theories of administrative 
lawmaking. The Supreme Court refuted the unitarians' theory of unfettered 
presidential power to manage the Executive Branch during the late 1980s, 299 
and most scholarly commentary likewise rejects the argument that the 
Constitution authorizes the President to direct or veto agency rulemaking in 
296. See, e.g., CALABRESI & Yoo, supra note 62, at 3-4 ("[T]he theory of the unitary executive 
holds that the Vesting Clause ... is a grant to the [P]resident of all the executive power, which 
includes the power to remove and direct all lower-level executive officials."); Steven G. Calabresi 
& Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570-82 
(1994) (arguing that the Vesting Clause of Article II confers a general and exclusive grant of power 
to execute federal law); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: 
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1992) (describing the 
mechanisms by which the President may exert the control granted in Article II over the executive 
department); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the 
President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 1012-15 (1992) (arguing that the framers 
designed Article II to provide for a politically accountable unitary executive to whom officers 
charged with enforcement of the law would be subordinate); David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Unitary 
Executive and Presidential Control of Executive Branch Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 309, 
317-20 (1993) (arguing that the Vesting Clause places the totality of the executive power, which 
includes the power to administrate, in the President); see also, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 
298, 405--06 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The authority of the President to control and supervise executive 
policymaking is derived from the Constitution."). 
297. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 102-03; Rivkin, supra note 296, at 309. 
298. See Kagan, supra note 20, at 2251. 
299. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 410-11 (1989) (approving of the "good 
cause" limitation placed by Congress on presidential removal of judges from the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988) (holding that Congress may 
constitutionally limit the Attorney General's removal power for certain officers to "good cause"). 
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the absence of congressional authorization.300 Moreover, as Kevin Stack has 
shown, most agencies' enabling acts expressly commit final rulemaking au-
thority to administrators, not the President.301 Thus, federal law does not 
appear to entrust the White House with broad managerial authority over 
agency rulemaking. 
To the extent that the scope of the President's legal authority remains 
unclear, the six principles of fiduciary representation, which reflect persons' 
moral capacity to constrain regulators' exercise of administrative discretion, 
arguably militate against presidential administration. From a comparative 
institutional perspective, agency administrators are generally more likely 
than presidents to act purposefully, reasonably, and transparently in 
rulemaking proceedings-not necessarily because they are more virtuous 
than presidents but because federal administrative law compels them to do 
so.302 
As we have seen, the principle of purposefulness requires regulators to 
respect their statutorily prescribed purposes. Presidential administration 
tends to compromise the coherence of agency rulemaking by subjecting 
agencies to the pressure of conflicting congressional and presidential 
purposes.303 Indeed, one reason why Congress entrusts final rulemaking 
300. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 29, at 1372 (suggesting that Congress can protect some 
civilian officers and department heads in the Executive Branch "from dismissal and countermand by 
the President"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who Would 
Distort and Abuse It: A Review ofThe Unitary Executive, by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher 
Yoo, U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 6-7, on file with Texas Law Review) 
(noting an occasion on which the head of OIRA stated that the President could only compel action 
from agency heads through the removal power); Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative over 
Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory 
of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 627,632 (1989) (noting two cases in the late 
1980s in which the Supreme Court approved of congressional power over "agency structure, 
location, and relationships that may properly have as its principal object the desire to limit the 
President's influence over ... administration policy"); Strauss, supra note 62, at 702 (observing 
that the "Constitution itself is at best ambivalent" on the question of whether the President may 
micromanage agency rulemaking); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 965, 973 (1997) (arguing that an administrator removable only "for cause" has a "right, and in 
some cases it may be his obligation, to refuse the President's direction, even if he realizes that his 
disappointed boss may immediately send him out of office"). 
301. Stack, supra note 30, at 310-12; see also Percival, supra note 29, at 966 ("When Congress 
enacts regulatory legislation vesting decision-making authority in agency heads, it generally 
envisions that decisions will be made by persons who possess expertise in the regulatory matters 
entrusted to them."). Congress might have different expectations about the President's role in some 
fields of regulation that fall squarely within his constitutional war powers or foreign relations 
authority. 
302. See Staszewski, supra note 101, at 1306 ("[L]egislative delegations ... should be 
understood as providing fmal decision-making authority to agency officials rather than to the 
President, based on their superior deliberative accountability .... "). 
303. Executive Order No. 12,866 states that one purpose of White House regulatory review is 
to ensure that "each agency's regulatory actions are consistent with ... the President's priorities." 
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 638,640 (1994); see also HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF 
FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 465 (2006) (observing that 
President Clinton had directed the FDA to adopt the tobacco regulation later struck down in FDA v. 
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authority to agency administrators rather than to the President is to ensure 
that federal regulation promotes legislative purposes (shaped deliberately 
through bicameralism and presentment) rather than the President's unilateral 
priorities. 304 
Unlike the White House, administrative agencies are also subject to a 
variety of procedural requirements that promote reasonable and transparent 
administration.305 For most agency rulemaking, federal law requires admin-
istrators to engage the public in a transparent and inclusive decision-making 
process, disclosing the records and communications that informed their 
decisions, and furnishing rational justifications for their rulemaking 
actions.306 When engaging in informal legislative rulemaking under the 
AP A, for instance, administrative agencies must publish notice of their pro-
posed rule, solicit public comments, and promulgate the final rule with "a 
concise general statement of [the rule's] basis and purpose."307 To satisfy 
judicial review, an agency must furnish a complete, contemporaneous ad-
ministrative record, clarify the administrator's rationale for their decisions, 
and satisfy courts that their final rule is not inconsistent with the empirical 
evidence before the agency?08 The administrator's rationale must address all 
salient aspects of the problem, including the merits of other reasonable 
alternatives, and justify any deviation from past rulemaking actions.309 To 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), despite the fact that FDA lawyers had 
already concluded the agency lacked the requisite statutory authorization). 
304. See Kagan, supra note 20, at 2323-25 (suggesting that Congress can limit the President's 
capacity to direct administrators in order to insulate administrative decision making). 
305. See Criddle, supra note 35, at 151 ("Agencies are bound to exercise reasonable prudence 
when exercising delegated powers, and they are forbidden from entering self-interested transactions 
or arbitrarily discriminating between similarly situated beneficiaries. Courts enforce these fiduciary 
duties as minimal standards of rationality, consistency, transparency, public deliberation, and 
thoroughness in investigating alternatives."). 
306. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 10-13 (2006) (requiring agency advisory committee meetings to be 
open to the public and transcribed, and providing for disclosure of virtually all documents used in 
these meetings); id. § 552 (permitting public access on request to a variety of documents and 
information, including published descriptions of the agencies' methods of operations, procedures, 
substantive rules, and statements of policy); id. § 552b(e)(l) (requiring agencies to give advance 
public notice "of the time, place, and subject matter" of certain agency meetings). 
307. ld. § 553(c). 
308. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983) 
(holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration had to reconsider a vehicle safety 
standard because the agency failed to present an adequate basis for its decision); Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 59, 65 (1995) ("To 
have any realistic chance of upholding a major rule on judicial review, an agency's statement of 
basis and purpose now must discuss in detail each of scores of policy disputes, data disputes, and 
alternatives to the rule adopted by the agency."); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American 
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 61 (1985) ("Agencies must give detailed explanations for their 
decisions; justify departures from past practices; allow participation in the regulatory process by a 
wide range of affected groups; and consider reasonable alternatives, explaining why they were 
rejected."). 
309. See INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996) ("[A]n irrational departure from [a general] 
policy (as opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned as 
'arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion."'); Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 414,416 
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the extent that agencies rely on their own expertise in rulemaking, they must 
be prepared to demonstrate and defend their expert judgment during hard 
look judicial review. 310 The APA thus contemplates that administrative 
agencies, as public fiduciaries, will employ procedures designed to ensure 
that their regulations are "the product of reasoned decisionmaking."311 No 
such procedural safeguards apply by law to the President.312 
Considerations of comparative expertise also favor vesting agency 
administrators rather than presidents with final rulemaking authority. 
Administrators generally possess greater experience in their fields of labor 
and thus are better positioned to evaluate the public interest reasonably.313 
Administrators are also more likely to immerse themselves in the technical 
details of a particular regulatory problem than presidents, whose myriad re-
sponsibilities preclude them from developing such specialized knowledge in 
each and every regulatory field. 314 Administrators are therefore more likely 
to act deliberately and deliberatively in approving or disapproving particular 
rulemaking proposals. 315 
The principle of transparency also militates strongly against presidential 
administration. Under current law, the President and his staff (outside 
OIRA) are not legally bound to reveal their communications with interest 
groups.316 No federal statute requires disclosure of such communications, 
and the White House has often relied on executive privilege to preserve the 
secrecy of its internal decision-making processes, denying observers access 
to records and testimony that would facilitate public monitoring and 
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (requiring that the Interstate Commerce Commission explain a deviation from its 
own promulgated standards). 
310. See Sunstein, supra note 308, at 61 (explaining that the hard look doctrine requires that 
agencies give explanations for their decisions). 
311. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52; cf Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of 
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 900 (observing that a fiduciary bears the burden to 
establish that he or she "has dealt candidly and fairly with" beneficiaries). 
312. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1991) (holding that the President's 
actions are not subject to review under the APA); Stack, supra note 30, at 318 (arguing that because 
the APA does not apply to the President, implying presidential directive powers into statutes 
delegating authority to agency officials may frustrate Congress's occasional interest in insulating 
agencies from presidential control). 
313. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REv. 1039, 1048-49 (1997) (discussing the assumption of subject-matter expertise as justifying 
agency action under the "public interest" theory of administrative law). 
314. See Bressman, supra note 43, at 512-13 (arguing that the President could never effectively 
micromanage regulatory agencies, both for lack of expertise and time). 
315. Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. 
L. REv. 271, 281-87 (1986) (characterizing administrators' role as experts who use their knowledge 
of their fields to make deliberative decisions with respect to regulatory decisions). 
316. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (upholding the application of 
executive privilege to the Vice President's communications with members of the energy industry in 
formulating energy policy). 
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accountability.317 Similarly, White House communications with 
administrative agencies are not ordinarily subject to the FOIA's mandatory 
disclosure requirements,318 and the White House has resisted efforts to ex-
pose its communications with agencies to public scrutiny on grounds of 
executive privilege.319 Granted, sunshine provisions adopted during the 
Clinton Administration do require OIRA to disclose contacts from private 
parties during formal OIRA review,320 and OIRA has adopted a similar 
"informal practice" of disclosing such contacts on draft rules?21 OIRA is 
also required to disclose its communications with agency officials following 
publication of a final rule.322 However, these disclosure requirements do not 
apply to informal OIRA communications prior to the initiation of formal 
OIRA review,323 nor do they apply to communications from any other White 
House offices.324 Hence, if the White House declines to disclose its reasons 
for initiating, modifying, suspending, or terminating rulemaking initiatives, 
its preferences and motivations may remain inscrutable to the electorate. 
From the perspective of transparency, therefore, the fiduciary model strongly 
317. See Gia B. Lee, The President"s Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 197, 198-99, 203 (2008) 
(arguing that executive confidentiality interferes with public accountability and the public's ability 
to evaluate the government's actions). 
318. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006) (exempting "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums 
or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the 
agency"); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 n.l6 & 150 (1975) (holding that 
FOIA protects presidential communications generally and materials related to intra-agency 
deliberative processes); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep't of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) ("There is [in FOIA) a built-in presidential communications privilege for records in the 
possession of, or created by, immediate White House advisers .... "). 
319. See generally Gary D. Bass & Sean Moulton, The Bush Administration's Secrecy Policy: 
A Call to Action to Protect Democratic Values 3 (OMB Watch, Working Paper, 2002), available at 
www.ombwatch.org/files/rtk/secrecy.pdf (discussing the Bush Administration's invocation of 
executive privilege in the context of the records of President Ronald Regan, documents related to 
campaign-finance investigations by Attorney General Janet Reno, and materials concerning pardons 
by President Bill Clinton); MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AM. LAW DIV., 
PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE AND RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 37-41 (2008), http://www.fas .org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL30319.pdf (reviewing 
presidential assertions of executive privilege from Kennedy to George W. Bush). 
320. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 646 ( 1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) 
(requiring agencies to Jog communications with persons outside the Executive Branch and limiting 
OIRA contact with persons outside the Executive Branch). 
321. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 118, at 1282. 
322. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(D), 3 C.F.R. at 648. 
323. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RULEMAKING: OMB'S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF 
AGENCIES' DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 7-8 (2003), http://www. 
gao.gov/new.items/d03929.pdf (noting that informal OIRA review often has a substantial effect on 
agency rulemaking). 
324. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(B), 3 C.F.R. at 648 (limiting disclosure to 
those communications between OJRA and individuals outside the Executive Branch, thus 
exempting disclosures from other White House offices); see also Seidenfeld, supra note 277, at 22 
n.l22 ("[E]ven commentators who advocate opening OMB review via some sort of sunshine laws 
focus primarily on access to communications between OMB and the regulating agency; they would 
allow communications between OMB and the White House, and within the White House itself to 
remain in the shadows lest deliberative discussion within the executive be chilled."). 
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favors entrusting final rulemaking authority to agency administrators rather 
than the popularly elected president. 
Other principles of fiduciary administration-fairness, integrity, and 
solicitude-pose more difficult questions. For example, are agency admin-
istrators or White House officials more likely to succumb to special-interest 
capture? Which of these decision makers would be more likely to adopt 
rules promoting their personal or institutional self-interest rather than acting 
solely for the benefit of their statutory beneficiaries? At present, these ques-
tions lack definitive answers. While anecdotal evidence of agency capture 
abounds, recent studies suggest that agency capture might actually be less 
widespread and systematic than public-choice theorists once imagined. 325 
Moreover, for every anecdote involving agency capture, one can point to an 
equally distressing example of White House capture.326 Pending more defini-
tive comparative empirical findings, it remains unclear whether 
administrative law would promote the principles of integrity, solicitude, and 
fairness more effectively by committing final rulemaking authority to the 
President or agency administrators. What we might say with some 
confidence, however, is that agencies' mandatory disclosure requirements 
make it far easier for the public to uncover administrators' breaches of trust 
and obtain meaningful remedies through the courts. Thus, considerations of 
comparative procedure-while hardly conclusive-at least cast doubt on the 
idea that the President is best positioned to satisfy the fiduciary principles of 
fairness, integrity, and solicitude in federal rulemaking. 
In sum, the fiduciary model supports the view that Congress may 
promote popular representation in the administrative state by entrusting final 
rulemaking authority to agency administrators rather than the popularly 
elected President. Federal administrative law promotes fiduciary representa-
tion by respecting agency administrators' statutorily entrusted authority and 
holding them to deliberation-reinforcing legal requirements of 
purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonableness, and 
transparency. In contrast, presidential administration, as it has developed 
recently under the Bush and Obama Administrations, lacks procedural safe-
guards sufficient to address the presidency's capacity for arbitrariness.327 
Entrusting final rulemaking authority to agency administrators thus would 
325. See. e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TfERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 344 (1986) (reporting that agency capture "is not by any means the norm, 
and where capture occurs, it does not always last"); Spence & Cross, supra note 197, at 121-22 
("[A]gency capture is no longer regarded as a valid descriptive theory of bureaucratic behavior."). 
326. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 118, at 1305-{)6, 1312 (arguing that the President and 
administrative agencies are similarly vulnerable to pressure from politically influential interest 
groups). 
327. RICHARDSON, supra note 165, at 37 ("[T]he republican ideal of freedom from 
domination ... demands that the government not have the capacity to exercise power arbitrarily."). 
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appear to promote the liberal ideals of fiduciary administration more 
effectively than presidential administration.328 
B. Fiduciary Representation and Interbranch Deliberation 
The fact that federal law generally entrusts fmal rulemaking authority to 
agency administrators does not mean that the White House, Congress, and 
the courts ought to remain silent in agency rulemaking proceedings. 
Administrative agencies are most likely to promote the public welfare if they 
develop regulations in open public deliberation with other government 
institutions. As the D.C. Circuit recognized in Sierra Club v. Costle,329 "Our 
form of government simply could not function effectively or rationally if key 
executive policymakers were isolated from each other and from the Chief 
Executive. "330 
Advocates of presidential administration have marshaled strong 
arguments for robust White House participation in the rulemaking process. 
As the federal government's chief executive officer, the President has a 
unique perspective on the administrative state and bears a special responsi-
bility to ensure that federal policy reflects adequate coordination across the 
administrative state. 331 The White House could help federal agencies coordi-
nate their regulatory policies and thereby minimize interagency conflicts. In 
some instances, White House policy guidance might also highlight important 
national perspectives that agency officials would otherwise overlook.332 
Agency rulemaking might likewise benefit from a regular OIRA audit to en-
sure that administrators give proper weight to trans-substantive policy 
concerns such as regulations' potential impact on the public fisc. None of 
these communications would be discouraged under the fiduciary model. To 
the contrary, under the principle of reasonableness, agencies would be 
obliged to give careful consideration to White House guidance just as they 
would information or policy guidance from any other source. 
328. See Farina, supra note 99, at 1037 (arguing that the Constitution contemplates a 
"multivoiced representational construct" in response to "the challenges of reflecting, and creating, 
the consent of the governed"); Shane, supra note 99, at 195 (noting that the alternative to 
presidential administration is political pluralism). 
329. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
330. !d. at 406. 
331. See, e.g., Cutler & Johnson, supra note 58, at 1410-11 ("[T]he President and his 
immediate staff have an overview of government management-and a constitutional responsibility 
for executing all the laws-that is not shared by a single regulatory agency, by any specialized 
congressional committee or by the Congress as a whole."); Rodriguez, supra note 20, at 1194-95 
("If anyone is positioned to coordinate diffuse regulatory policy, it is the President, as leader of the 
executive branch."); Seidenfeld, supra note 277, at l3 ("[T]he White House may be the only 
governmental institution capable of successfully coordinating government policy and creating a 
coherent agenda .... "); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in 
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 189 (1986) ("[T]he President is in a good position to 
centralize and coordinate the regulatory process."). 
332. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 121, at 89 (repeating the opinion of interview 
respondents that the President can convey a broader perspective on rulemaking than agencies). 
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To ensure that agencies do not arbitrarily neglect White House guidance 
or other public comments, federal courts should buttress fiduciary 
representation through hard look judicial review. Under the fiduciary model, 
hard look judicial review serves a representation-reinforcing role analogous 
to John Hart Ely's celebrated theory of judicial review.333 The purpose of 
judicial review on both accounts is to reinforce popular representation 
through a "process of government" agreeable to persons of diverse ideologi-
cal commitments.334 Unlike Ely's theory of judicial review,335 however, the 
fiduciary model does not embrace process as an alternative to substantive 
values. As Ely's critics have observed, "The process theme by itself 
determines almost nothing unless its presuppositions are specified, and its 
content supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and 
values .... "336 Instead, within the fiduciary model of popular representation, 
the substantive rights and values that should guide judicial review of admin-
istrative action are made explicit. The fiduciary model rests agency 
rulemaking processes on discrete substantive principles that arise from the 
essential normative foundations of the state-subject fiduciary relationship: 
purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonableness, and 
transparency. Although these principles could conceivably demarcate a 
domain of social consensus regarding good governance, their legal authority 
arises from the fiduciary principle itself, not from any actual or notional 
consensus. 
To be clear, the fiduciary model does not purport to furnish a 
comprehensive account of the administrative state's political legitimacy. 
Some might argue, for example, that the political legitimacy of agency 
rulemaking depends upon not only popular representation or popular 
sovereignty per se but also consequentialist concerns for government 
effectiveness. Some delegations of rulemaking power to administrative 
agencies may be unwise or poorly tailored to meet the public's needs. 
Moreover, even if Congress's delegations are sound, fiduciary administration 
does not ensure that agency regulations will always yield the best possible 
outcomes-or even salutary outcomes-for the public welfare. Indeed, for 
some pressing regulatory problems there may be no consensus or majority 
view about what would constitute a "positive outcome" in the first place. At 
333. See ELY, supra note 2, at 87 (providing a brief overview of Ely's theory of judicial 
review). 
334. See id. at 100-0 I (explaining that the Constitution protects the interests of all by 
structuring decision processes at all levels to attempt to ensure that everyone's interests will be 
actually or virtually represented). 
335. See id. at 101 (disavowing any "governing ideology"). 
336. Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 
YALE L.J. 1063, I 064 (1980); see also Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The 
Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045 (1980) ("The 
fundamental difficulty with Ely's theory is that its basic premise, that obstacles to political 
participation should be removed, is hardly value-free."). 
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most, therefore, fiduciary representation narrows the scope of agency 
discretion within minimally acceptable bounds: agencies honor popular 
sovereignty as fiduciary representatives if they adopt policies that reflect 
appropriate purposefulness, integrity, solicitude, fairness, reasonableness, 
and transparency. To the extent that questions of political legitimacy venture 
beyond these constitutive principles of fiduciary representation, the fiduciary 
model is arguably subject to the classic criticisms of process theory 
generally-namely, that it is "fundamentally incomplete" in practice.337 
Yet the fiduciary model's very incompleteness may be a virtue.338 As 
discussed previously, presidential administration tends to stifle agency 
deliberation and entrench federal regulations against legislative correction. 
The fiduciary model's minimalist conception of popular representation, in 
contrast, leaves ample room for continuing public deliberation both inside 
and outside the rulemaking process over the best means and ends for federal 
regulation. Fiduciary administration fosters public deliberation by obliging 
agencies to investigate regulatory problems, engage experts, and educate 
other public officials and the citizenry at large about the stakes of agency 
regulation. Far from entrenching presidential preferences, fiduciary adminis-
tration facilitates continued dialogue and collaboration between 
administrative agencies and Congress, enabling legislators to revisit agency 
rulemaking decisions and revise federal regulation through their own delib-
erative lawmaking processes. Federal judges, for their part, may also 
reinforce fiduciary representation by correcting deliberation failures in the 
rulemaking process, overturning agency regulations that are unfair, 
unreasonable, or inconsistent with Congress's statutory objectives.339 Where 
administrative agencies betray congressional purpose or violate the public 
trust in rulemaking, the President and Congress retain a measure of residual 
control as public fiduciaries in their own right to enact new legislation or re-
move wayward agency officials.340 This dynamic conversation between the 
three branches, rather than presidential representation alone, best honors the 
Constitution's republican vision of achieving popular representation through 
polyphonic, interbranch deliberation.341 
C. The Passive Virtues of Fiduciary Administration 
Sadly, the prospects of immediate congressional action to strengthen 
fiduciary administration are not promising. In the past, Congress has 
33 7. Tribe, supra note 336, at I 064. 
338. For a general defense of minimal ism in judicial decision making, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
ONE CASE AT A TIME ( 1999). 
339. See supra text accompanying notes 308-311; cf ELY, supra note 2, at 88 (arguing that 
judicial review serves a representation-reinforcing role by addressing political·process failures in 
majoritarian decision making). 
340. Criddle, supra note 35, at 129-30. 
341. See Farina, supra note 99, at 1019, 1037 (noting that the founders understood that the will 
of the people cannot be captured by any single part of the government). 
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deflected proposals designed to promote fiduciary administration such as 
expanding notice-and-comment rulemaking and judicial review of agency 
inaction.342 Congress would likely resist this Article's proposal to prohibit ex 
parte White House communications because the proposed change would un-
dermine arguments for exempting similar congressional communications 
from disclosure.343 Until a major scandal erupts, Congress is unlikely to 
spend its own political capital on a contentious battle with the Executive 
Branch over administrative procedure, judicial review, or government 
transparency. 
Pending legislative action on these proposals, the Obama 
Administration should voluntarily promote fiduciary administration in 
agency rulemaking by observing prudential principles of nonintervention 
comparable to Bickel's renowned passive virtues.344 In The Least Dangerous 
Branch, Bickel implored the Supreme Court to employ the standing doctrine, 
the ripeness doctrine, and the political question doctrine to reduce the Court's 
institutional footprint on the political process.345 Bickel commended these 
techniques of constitutional avoidance as a last line of defense "mark[ing] the 
point at which the Court gives the electoral institutions their head and itself 
stays out of politics."346 In a similar spirit of institutional humility, the 
incoming Obama Administration should renounce the Bush Administration's 
overly aggressive assertions of executive power and observe the prudential 
principles of deliberative process, transparency, and respect for legally en-
trusted authority. For example, if Congress declines to revisit the APA's 
exemptions to informal rulemaking, federal agencies should still commit 
themselves to employ notice-and-comment rulemaking in all contexts where 
these procedures would not be impracticable. If agencies decide to postpone 
or discontinue rulemaking initiatives, they should take care to provide a rea-
soned explanation for their decision. President Obama should also 
promulgate a new executive order directing agencies to place on the public 
record all communications with White House staff regarding pending infor-
mal rulemaking proceedings. Additionally, Obama should disavow the Bush 
Administration's more egregious tactics of managerial control such as 
placing RPOs as White House gatekeepers for agency rulemaking and the 
arbitrary editing and suppression of expert reports on matters germane to 
342. PIERCE, supra note 11, at 331. 
343. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (defending ex parte 
congressional communications with the EPA on the ground that "Americans rightly expect their 
elected representatives to voice their grievances and preferences concerning the administration of 
our laws"). 
344. BICKEL, supra note I, at 200. 
345. /d. at 111-98; see also Alexander M. Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 
42-47 (1961) (explaining and proposing the ripeness, standing, and political question doctrines). 
346. Bickel, supra note 345, at 51. 
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agency rulemaking.347 By observing these and other "passive virtues" of 
fiduciary administration, the Obama Administration could greatly enhance 
fiduciary representation in administrative lawmaking. 
The prudential principles of fiduciary administration may serve as a 
critical test of character for the new Obama Administration. In his inaugural 
address, President Obama affirmed the need for responsible government to 
"restore the vital trust between a people and their government" by ensuring 
that "those of us who manage the public's dollars will be held to account, to 
spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day."348 
Obama has taken several concrete steps to realize this ideal, including in-
structing all agency heads to "adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure, 
in order to renew their commitment to the principles embodied in FOlA, and 
to usher in a new era of open Government."349 Yet the enormity of the 
ongoing financial crisis and other pressing national and international 
challenges will surely test the President's resolve to safeguard the "ideals" of 
deliberative, transparent government rather than compromise these principles 
of fiduciary representation "for expediency's sake."35° Care must be taken 
therefore to safeguard the passive virtues of fiduciary administration, lest 
enthusiasm for the incoming President lead to broader centralization of 
administrative lawmaking and lasting setbacks for fiduciary representation in 
the administrative state. 
347. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin & R. Jeffrey Smith, EPA Won't Act on Emissions This Year: 
Instead of New Rules, More Comments Sought, WASH. POST, July II, 2008, at AI ("[T]he White 
House has walked a tortured policy path, editing its officials' congressional testimony, refusing to 
read documents prepared by career employees and approved by top appointees, requesting changes 
in computer models to lower estimates of the benefits of curbing carbon dioxide, and pushing 
narrowly drafted legislation on fuel-economy standards that officials said was meant to sap public 
interest in wider regulatory action."); White House Climate Change Policy-Delay, Delete, and 
Deny, OMB WATCH, July 27, 2008, http://www.ombwatch.org/node/3741 (criticizing Vice 
President Dick Cheney's alteration of a senior CDC official's congressional testimony on the health 
risks of climate change). 
348. The Address: 'All This We Will Do,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at 2; see also Brian 
Knowlton, After a Day of Crowds and Celebrations, Obama Turns to Sobering Challenges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0J/22/world/americas/22iht-
22obamacnd.J9577085.html (quoting President Obama's assertion that all executive officers are 
"keepers of the public trust" and that his Administration would stand not "on the side of those who 
want to withhold information but those who seek to make it known"). 
349. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 2009 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 00009 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
350. See id. ("reaffirming the commitment to accountability and transparency" by directing the 
United States "Attorney General to issue new guidelines governing the FOIA to the heads of 
executive departments and agencies"); see also John Schwartz, Obama Backs Off a Reversal on 
Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at Al2 (quoting Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. who stated 
that "[i]t is the policy of this administration to invoke the state secrets privilege only when 
necessary and in the most appropriate cases"). 
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VI. Conclusion 
Defenders of presidential administration have characterized the 
President as "a kind of democratic oracle, tasked with giving voice to the 
people's power to redefine public life through democratic action."351 The 
problem with this Wilsonian conception of the Presidency is that the will of 
the people is an inscrutable, Delphic guide.352 Rarely does public opinion 
crystallize into a clear national consensus on questions of federal regulation. 
Moreover, it is hardly self-evident that presidential administration would be 
the best strategy for vindicating public preferences in the administrative state. 
As Cynthia Farina has observed, any attempt to equate the popular will with 
the President's will "obscures complex problems ... of information, 
prediction, and risk perception" and "slides over vexed questions ... of when 
leaders should lead rather than follow and of how the act of governing be-
comes a process in which the collective will is formed, rather than merely 
implemented."353 Confronting these complex problems of identification and 
implementation, no sober-minded president could believe that his or her 
preferences on matters of regulatory policy would correlate neatly with the 
ever-elusive will of the people. 
A far more constructive conception of popular representation is the idea 
that public officers serve as fiduciary representatives for the people subject to 
their power. Under this model, popular representation depends upon whether 
administrative agencies act purposefully, fairly, reasonably, and transparently 
with integrity and solicitude to the interests of the people subject to their 
power. In contrast, the President's fiduciary role in agency rulemaking con-
sists primarily of persuasion, coordination, and general oversight, taking care 
that administrative agencies exercise their rulemaking powers within the 
law's limits. Congress and the courts may also reinforce popular representa-
tion by correcting agency deliberation failures as they arise in agency 
rulemaking. Within this intricate network of nested fiduciary relations lies 
the best hope for meaningful popular representation in agency rulemaking. 
351. See Purdy, supra note 57, at 1849 (describing Wilson's view of the presidency). 
352. See A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, PUBLIC OPINION AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT 73 (1913) 
(quoting Sir Henry Maine as stating, "[T]he devotee of democracy is much in the same position as 
the Greeks with their oracles. All agreed that the voice of the oracle was the voice of god; but 
everybody allowed that when he spoke he was not as intelligible as might be desired."). 
353. Farina, supra note 99, at 988. 
